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EQUAL EMPLOYMENT AND THIRD PARTY
PRIVACY INTERESTS: AN ANALYTICAL
FRAMEWORK FOR RECONCILING
COMPETING RIGHTS
DEBORAH A. CALLOWA Y*
INTRODUCTION7p TLE VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19641 prohibits sex discrimina-
tion in employment. The statutory prohibition is deceptively simple.
It prohibits employers from discriminating "against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment, because of such individual's ... sex." Reconciling these words
with other important interests, such as privacy, has proved troublesome.
Courts have interpreted Title VII broadly to prohibit both intentional sex
discrimination and neutral employment practices that have a disparate
impact on employees of one sex.3 Both forms of discrimination are sub-
ject to narrow exceptions. The statute permits intentional discrimination
"in those certain instances where.., sex.., is a bona fide occupational
qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that partic-
ular business or enterprise."4 In addition, the judicially developed busi-
ness necessity defense provides an exception to disparate impact
discrimination when a challenged neutral employment practice is neces-
sary for an employer to operate a business safely and efficiently.' Re-
cently hospitals, prisons and other employers have relied on the bona fide
occupational qualification (bfoq) defense, asserting that it permits them
to discriminate on the basis of sex to protect the privacy interests of their
customers, patients, prisoners or employees.
Does Title VII require employers to hire without regard to gender de-
spite the privacy interests of third parties? Are prisons required to hire
female guards to search and supervise male inmates while they sleep,
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law; B.A. 1970,
Middlebury College; J.D. 1978, Georgetown University Law Center. I am deeply in-
debted to a number of individuals for reading and commenting on earlier drafts of this
Article, particularly Mayer Freed (Northwestern University Law School), Jim Lindgren
(University of Connecticut School of Law), Tom Morawetz (University of Connecticut
School of Law), Howard Sacks (University of Connecticut School of Law) and Wendy
Williams (Georgetown University Law Center) for their encouragement, critical com-
ments and suggestions. I would like to express my appreciation to Terry Packard and
Maryanne Puglise for their excellent research assistance.
1. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VII, §§ 701-716, 78 Stat. 241,
253-66 (1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982)) [hereinafter cited as
"Title VII"].
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1982).
3. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1982).
5. See infra notes 185-92 and accompanying text.
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shower, change clothes and use the toilet? Are hospitals required to hire
male nurses to examine, clean and care for pregnant women in labor and
delivery rooms? The first courts to consider these questions were quick
to answer in the negative.
Laws forbidding discrimination in hiring on the basis of sex do not
purport to erase all differences between the sexes. These laws recog-
nize that there are jobs for which one sex is inherently and biologically
more qualified than those of the opposite sex. The biological difference
between men and women which in turn produce [sic] psychological
differences are the facts that justify limiting personal contact under
intimate circumstances to those of the same sex. 6
[I]t would be a considerable violation of community standards of mo-
rality or propriety to have a person of one sex using a toilet or locker
room while a person of the other sex was present.
Virtually every court facing this issue has agreed that privacy consid-
erations can form the basis of a bfoq defense.8 Recently, however, in
6. Philadelphia v. Human Relations Comm'n, 7 Pa. Commw. 500, 510 n.7, 300 A.2d
97, 103 n.7 (1973). Although this case was decided under the Pennsylvania Human Rela-
tions Act, the court held that "the language used by the Pennsylvania Legislature in
providing the 'bona fide occupational qualification' exception demonstrated that it in-
tended this term to be synonymous with, and interpreted in like manner as that same
term is used in the Equal Employment Opportunity Act." Id. at 506, 300 A.2d at 101.
7. Corn Prods. Co. Int'l v. Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int'l Union, 1970 Lab.
Arb. Awards (CCII) 1 8432, at 4414 (1970) (Gross, Arb.). In this case, the arbitrator
applied Title VII's bona fide occupational qualification (bfoq) defense to find that the
employer's refusal to assign a female to clean a men's bathroom was permissible. See id.
at 4413-14.
8. See, eg., Hardin v. Stynchcomb, 691 F.2d 1364, 1370-71 (11th Cir. 1982) (to
establish a valid bfoq defense, employer must prove that he cannot reassign essential job
responsibilities to eliminate the clash between privacy interests of inmates and employ-
ment rights of female deputy sheriffs); Brooks v. ACF Indus., 537 F. Supp. 1122, 1131-32
(S.D. W. Va. 1982) (privacy rights of third parties may be basis for valid bfoq); EEOC v.
Mercy Health Center, 29 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 159, 162-63 (W.D. Okla. 1982)
(same); Harden v. Dayton Human Rehab. Center, 520 F. Supp. 769, 777-81 (S.D. Ohio
1981) (privacy can be basis for bfoq if employer can show factual basis for privacy in-
fringement and inability to rearrange job responsibilities); Backus v. Baptist Medical
Center, 510 F. Supp. 1191, 1193-96 (E.D. Ark. 1981) (privacy rights of third parties may
be basis for valid bfoq), vacated as moot, 671 F.2d 1100 (8th Cir. 1982); Fesel v. Masonic
Home, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 1346, 1350-51 (D. Del. 1978) (privacy interests of third parties
may be basis for valid bfoq defense), affid mem., 591 F.2d 1334 (3d Cir. 1979); Sutton v.
National Distillers Prods. Co., 445 F. Supp. 1319, 1325 (S.D. Ohio 1978) (same), af'd,
628 F.2d 936 (6th Cir. 1980); Reynolds v. Wise, 375 F. Supp. 145, 151 (N.D. Tex. 1974)
(same); Long v. California State Personnel Bd., 41 Cal. App. 3d 1000, 1015-18, 116 Cal.
Rptr. 562, 572-75 (1974) (same); EEOC Decision No. 82-4, 28 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 1845, 1847 (1982) (to establish valid bfoq defense, employer must prove that he
cannot rearrange essential job responsibilities to minimize clash between privacy interests
of detainees and non-discrimination principle of Title VII); cf Philadelphia v. Human
Relations Comm'n, 7 Pa. Commw. 500, 510-12, 300 A.2d 97, 102-03 (1973) (interpreting
Pennsylvania Human Relations Act). But see Griffin v. Michigan Dep't of Corrections,
30 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 638, 646-48 (E.D. Mich. 1982) (sex is not a bfoq for
positions requiring guards to view naked inmates of the opposite sex); Forts v. Ward, 471
F. Supp. 1095, 1099 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (court acknowledging that sex is not a bfoq for "the
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response to a flood of litigation both by prisoners seeking privacy and by
individuals of both sexes seeking employment as prison guards, courts
have adopted a solomonic approach to the problem designed both to pro-
mote equal employment and to protect inmate privacy. Under this ap-
proach, courts have refused to find that sex is a bfoq for the position of
prison guard if the prison can modify its procedures or structures to
eliminate the privacy infringement altogether."
Although this approach appeals to courts, employees and prisoners,"0
the legal theory on which it is based mandates results that conflict with
the underlying principles of Title VII. Under current treatment of the
issue, courts permit employers to discriminate on the basis of sex when-
ever equal employment would result in unavoidable privacy infringe-
ments. Nudity can be shielded from sight, but when an employee must
touch another individual to perform his or her job, the invasion of pri-
vacy cannot be eliminated. Salespersons must fit pants, police must frisk
suspects, nurses and doctors must examine patients and guards must
search prisoners. Relying on community standards of privacy, courts
have permitted hospitals to exclude males from positions requiring inti-
mate contact with female patients while allowing females to perform
nursing tasks involving intimate contact with male patients."I These de-
cisions contradict Title VII's basic mandate---equal treatment of simi-
larly situated individuals.
The current approach further conflicts with another of Title VII's ba-
sic goals because it expressly maintains the status quo. Intimate contact
between an employee and a patient of the opposite sex is acceptable when
the public is accustomed to it-when females fill their traditional role as
nurses and males fill their traditional role as doctors, police officers and
job of a correction officer," yet applying a balancing test nonetheless), vacated in part on
other grounds, 621 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir. 1980).
9. See, eg., Harden v. Dayton Human Rehab. Center, 520 F. Supp. 769, 779-81
(S.D. Ohio 1981) (noting possibility that conflict could be avoided by permitting female
inmates to cover their windows); Forts v. Ward, 471 F. Supp. 1095, 1101 (S.D.N.Y.
1978) (requiring "mottled or smoky" glass on shower doors), vacated in part on other
grounds, 621 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir. 1980); cf. Bowling v. Enomoto, 514 F. Supp. 201, 204
(N.D. Cal. 1981) (leaving to California correctional authorities task of fashioning remedy
that would maximize equal employment opportunities and minimize intrusions on pris-
oner privacy).
10. One party to these disputes may not be entirely pleased with the result--the em-
ployers who must pay for the costs of the structural and procedural alterations ordered
by the courts. The Second Circuit was able to avoid the issue: "We need not decide in
this case to what extent an employer may be required to expend money or alter proce-
dures to avoid a situation that, if uncorrected, would justify gender-based discrimination.
In this case, the employer has already acknowledged its willingness to make necessary
changes." Forts v. Ward, 621 F.2d 1210, 1216 (2d Cir. 1980). Other courts have as-
sumed that they have the necessary authority to order employers to pay for necessary
modifications. See, e.g., Harden v. Dayton Human Rehab. Center, 520 F. Supp. 769, 780
(S.D. Ohio 1981). The extent to which Title VII permits courts to impose costs on de-
fendants in order to promote equal employment is outside the scope of this Article.
11. See infra notes 129-49 and accompanying text.
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prison guards. Privacy interests are asserted and prevail when men or
women attempt to break into the traditionally segregated professions.
The primary purpose of this Article is to resolve the conflict between
privacy and equal employment that arises when courts find protectable
privacy interests. A secondary purpose is to encourage courts to take a
closer look at the assumption that touching or viewing unclothed people
of the opposite sex infringes on privacy interests entitled to protection.
Part I examines the employment rights and privacy interests that conflict
when individuals seek employment in positions requiring such touching
or viewing. Part II explores the legal theory currently employed by
courts attempting to resolve this conflict. After exposing the flaws in this
theory, Part III concludes by presenting a framework for reconciling
competing privacy and equal employment rights.
I. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS: THE COMPETING RIGHTS
A. Employment Rights Implicated
Employees in many occupations must either touch or view people who
are unclothed or who are performing bodily functions. If employers can
freely discriminate on the basis of sex to protect the privacy interests of
these people, many employment opportunities for women and men will
be affected. Corrections, law enforcement and health care are three pro-
fessions in which equal employment collides with privacy rights. 12
1. Corrections
The federal prison system employs 3979 correctional officers. Three
hundred fifty-five (8.9%) of them are women.1 3 Over 70,000 people
work as correctional officers in state prisons. 4 Approximately twelve
percent of these are women. 5 Many of these positions are affected by
privacy considerations.
The Federal Bureau of Prisons is committed to integrating both sexes
into its prison staff by placing both women and men in all positions
within the prison system. 6 The only sex-based restriction is that guards
may not strip search inmates of the opposite sex, except in an emergency.
Some states have adopted the federal policy of fully integrating female
correctional officers.17 Others employ female officers in male prisons, but
12. Occupations such as locker room or bathroom attendant, masseur or masseuse
and clothing salesperson also may require employees to view or touch people.
13. Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice
Statistics--1984, at 113 (1985) [hereinafter cited as 1984 Sourcebook].
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. Telephone interview with Pat Sledge, Special Assistant to Director, Federal Bu-
reau of Prisons (July 20, 1983).
17. California, New York, Wisconsin, Oklahoma and Nevada are among these. See
Woestendiek, Uneasy presence, Philadelphia Inquirer, Feb. 13, 1983, at 6B, col. 3.
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prohibit them from working in male cell blocks."8
In both systems, privacy considerations reduce female employment op-
portunities because approximately ninety-five percent of the prisoners are
male.19 Even though women comprise twelve percent of the correctional
officers in state prisons, they will never be promoted if they are barred
from male cell blocks and experience in cell blocks is a prerequisite to
supervisory positions. For example, although 198 female guards work in
Maryland's male prisons, they are excluded from 671 of the 1065 prison
assignments because they cannot enter male cell blocks." In Minnesota,
women are even barred from the school wing because they cannot work
in areas with toilets. 21
In the federal system and in states that have adopted the federal pol-
icy, privacy considerations still affect employment because supervisors
continue to be reluctant to assign women to contact positions.' As these
women are transferred to positions that require more intimate contact,
inmates may limit female employment by obtaining court orders in inva-
sion of privacy actions.
2. Law Enforcement
Privacy is relevant to employment opportunities in law enforcement
because police officers must frisk and search suspects and arrestees of the
opposite sex. In 1981, there were 398,064 sworn police officers in the
United States, 94.5% of whom were men.' Because most suspects and
arrestees are male,24 concern for their privacy will result primarily in loss
of job opportunities for women.
3. Health Care
Considerations of privacy and of patient preference affect millions of
18. Maryland, Minnesota and Illinois are among these. See Struck, Female guards
find some doors barred, Baltimore Sun, Oct. 3, 1982, at C4, col. 3; Kimball, Prison guard
fighting alleged sex discrimination, Minneapolis Tribune, April 4, 1982, at lB, cols. 3-4;
Kleiman, Women help bring down prison walls, Chicago Tribune, Feb. 5, 1978, at 5-4, col.
1; cf. Philadelphia Inquirer, Apr. 19, 1983, at 2-B, cols. 1-2 (male inmates in Penn-
sylvania have sued to enjoin female officers from working in male cellblocks).
19. See Center for Women Policy Studies, Women Employed in Corrections xxv
(1980).
20. See Struck, supra note 18, at Cl, col. 5, C4, col. 3.
21. See Kimball, supra note 18, at IB, cols. 5-6.
22. See G. Ingram, The Role of Women in Male Federal Correctional Institutions,
Proceedings of the One Hundred and Tenth Annual Congress of Correction of the Amer-
ican Correctional Association 275, 277-78, 281 (1980) (male staff employees express res-
ervations about employing females in all-male institutions).
23. Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice
Statistics-1983, at 49 (1984) [hereinafter cited as 1983 Sourcebook]. Nearly all of the
jobs are affected since all officers are required to do some patrol work during which they
may have to pat search a suspect of the opposite sex. Cf. R. Lundman, Police and Polic-
ing: An Introduction 67-68, 87-88, 103-04, 115-16 (1980).
24. See Tjaden & Tjaden, Differential Treatment of the Female Felon: Myth or Real-
ity?, in Comparing Female and Male Offenders 73-74 (M. Warren ed. 1981).
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health care jobs. In 1980, there were 467,679 physicians in the United
States, 54,284 (11.6%) of whom were women. 25 There are approxi-
mately 1,100,000 active R.N.s and 550,000 L.P.N.s in the United
States,2 6 over 95% of whom are women.27 Both doctors and nurses have
frequent intimate contact with patients.28 Positions in other areas, such
as physical therapy, radiology and prosthetics also require intimate view-
ing or touching of patients. If privacy interests defined by patient prefer-
ence or community standards dictate employment opportunities in these
fields, many of these positions will be closed to either women or men.
B. Privacy Rights Implicated
By hiring both men and women to fill contact positions, employers
could expose countless prisoners, arrestees, patients, customers and co-
workers to intimate touching and viewing by persons of the opposite sex.
To maintain security, prison guards must watch inmates constantly-
even while the prisoners shower, dress, sleep or use the toilet. To stop
the flow of contraband in and out of prisons, guards strip prisoners and
visually or manually search their naked bodies, including their genitals
and their vaginal and anal body cavities.29 Law enforcement officers
frisk and sometimes strip search arrestees. Health care professionals
dress, undress and bathe patients, help them use the toilet, examine all
parts of their bodies and body cavities, insert catheters, shave genital hair
in preparation for surgery and administer enemas and shots.3" In indus-
try, cleaning personnel may view co-workers or customers using bath-
rooms or changing clothes in locker rooms. Security guards frisk,
search, or even strip search co-workers and customers. Finally, sales
personnel touch customers to fit clothes and masseurs and masseuses
touch customers to massage them.
Individuals have rights of privacy that protect them from unwanted
exposure of their naked bodies to touching or viewing by strangers.
Although privacy is a virtually undefinable concept 3' any "plausible defi-
25. American Medical Ass'n, Physician Characteristics and Distribution in the U.S.
10 (1982).
26. U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., Source Book-Nursing Personnel iii
(1981).
27. United States Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States:
1985, at 102 (1984) (95.8% registered nurses are women); Lewis & Lewis, The Potential
Impact of Sexual Equality on Health, 297 New Eng. J. Med. 863, 863 (1977) (97% regis-
tered nurses are women).
28. See infra note 30.
29. See National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice, Women Employed
in Corrections 101-02 (1983).
30. See J.B. Lippincott Co., The Lippincott Manual of Nursing Practice 85-88, 416-
17, 421-22, 482-85 (3d ed. 1982); S. Whitehead, Nursing Care of the Adult Urology Pa-
tient 39-45 (1970); Kilker & Wilkerson, 8-Point Postpartum Assessment, Nursing, May
1973, at 56.
31. In Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977), the Supreme Court suggested that the
right to privacy encompassed an individual's right to independent choice in "certain
kinds of important decisions," id. at 599-600, including questions of "marriage, procrea-
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nition" of privacy "must take the body as its first and most basic refer-
ence for control over personal identity."32  Courts have had little
difficulty concluding that the right to privacy is implicated when an indi-
vidual claims the right to control his or her own body33 or complains
about being touched or viewed while naked. "We cannot conceive of a
more basic subject of privacy than the naked body. The desire to shield
one's unclothed figured [sic] from view of strangers, and particularly
strangers of the opposite sex, is impelled by elementary self-respect and
personal dignity."'
tion, contraception... and child rearing." Id. at 600 n.26 (quoting Paul v. Davis, 424
U.S. 693, 713 (1976)). The right also encompasses a general "individual interest in avoid-
ing disclosures of personal matters." Id. at 599. Commentators' definitions of privacy
are equally broad. See, eg., Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 Yale LJ. 421,
428-29 (1980) ("[P]rivacy is a limitation of others' access to an individual.... A loss of
privacy occurs as others obtain information about an individual, pay attention to him, or
gain access to him. These three elements of secrecy, anonymity, and solitude are distinct
and independent, but interrelated, and the complex concept of privacy is richer than any
definition centered around only one of them."); Gerety, Redefining Pf'racy, 12 Harv.
C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 233, 236 (1977) (defining privacy in terms of autonomy, intimacy and
identity); Gross, Privacy and Autonomy, in Nomos XIII, Privacy 169 (J. Pennock & J.
Chapman eds. 1971) (privacy is "control over acquaintance with one's personal affairs")
(emphasis in original); Gross, The Concept of Privacy, 42 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 34, 35-36 (1967)
("privacy is the condition of human life in which acquaintance with a person or with
affairs of his life which are personal to him is limited") (emphasis omitted); Parker, A
Definition of Privacy, 27 Rutgers L. Rev. 275, 281 (1974) ("privacy is control over when
and by whom the various parts of us can be sensed by others") (emphasis omitted); Com-
ment, A Taxonomy of Privacy: Repose, Sanctuary, and Intimate Decision, 64 Calif. L
Rev. 1447, 1451-78 (1976) (privacy protects individuals from unwanted stimuli and intru-
sive observation, and grants them autonomy with respect to personal life choices).
Lawrence Tribe has suggested that a precise definition of privacy would be
dysfunctional:
Society alters, some say evolves. Values change. Majorities grow more com-
placent; factions rigidify.
. Any fundamental rights of personhood and privacy too precisely or in-
flexibly defined defy the seasons and are likely to be bypassed by the spring
floods. The best we can hope for is to encourage wise reflection-through strict
scrutiny of any government action or deliberate omission that appears to trans-
gress what it means to be human at a given time and place. Nothing less will
yield a language and structure for creating a future continuous with and contig-
uous to the most humane designs of the past.
L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 892-93 (1978).
32. Gerety,supra note 31, at 266 & n.119; see, e.g., L. Tribe, supra note 31, at 913 ("it
is undeniable that the body constitutes the major locus of separation between the individ-
ual and the world and is in that sense the first object of each person's freedom"); Gavison,
supra note 31, at 433 ("Individuals lose privacy when others gain physical access to them.
Physical access here means physical proximity-that Y is close enough to touch or ob-
serve X through normal use of his senses.") (emphasis in original); Parker, supra note 3 1,
at 281 (Privacy is "control over who can sense us" and "[b]y 'sensed,' is meant simply
seen, heard, touched, smelled, or tasted. By 'parts of us,' is meant the parts of our bodies,
our voices, and the products of our bodies.").
33. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (the right to privacy encompasses a
woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy because she has a right to
avoid the risk that maternity or additional offspring may impair her mental or physical
health).
34. York v. Story, 324 F.2d 450, 455 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 939
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Bodily privacy rights spring from a variety of sources. The fourth
amendment of the Constitution expressly grants the right to be secure
from unreasonable body searches.35 But we must look between the lines
of that document to find protection from other forms of unwanted gov-
ernment viewing and touching. In York v. Story,36 the Ninth Circuit
relied on the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to find that
an assault victim's right to privacy was violated when a police officer
photographed her in the nude and distributed the pictures to fellow of-
ficers. 37 The fourth amendment can be read to protect the privacy of the
home and person "against all unreasonable intrusion of whatever charac-
ter."' 38 The Supreme Court, in Roe v. Wade,39 relied on a variety of con-
(1964); see, eg., Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 769-70 (1966) ("The interests in
human dignity and privacy which the Fourth Amendment protects forbid any... intru-
sions [beyond the body's surface] on the mere chance that desired evidence might be
obtained."); Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891) ("[n]o right is held
more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every
individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or
interference of others"); Forts v. Ward, 471 F. Supp. 1095, 1098 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (despite
limited nature of inmate's right of privacy, female inmate's right of privacy is invaded by
male guard viewing her while she is using the toilet), vacated in part on other grounds, 621
F.2d 1210 (2d Cir. 1980); see also Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, 276 Ala. 380, 381-
84, 162 So. 2d 474, 476-78 (1964) (publication of picture showing plaintiff with her dress
blown up revealing her panties as she left fun house at county fair constituted invasion of
privacy even though the picture was taken in public); Commonwealth v. Wiseman, 356
Mass. 251, 258-59, 249 N.E.2d 610, 615-16 (1969) (injunction issued to prevent public
showing of film of insane persons at state correctional institution where they were shown
naked or in pain and valid releases for film's exhibition were not supplied), cert. denied,
398 U.S. 960 (1970).
But even when unwanted bodily intrusions are involved, the limits of the right to pri-
vacy remain elusive.
[I]t is important to have a way of talking about these matters in which the
intrusion caused by the police officer who gently shoves a person back to clear
the way for an ambulance, for example, does not count even potentially as an
invasion of privacy or personhood. To be sure, every such interference with
liberty calls for some sort ofjustification. But it would demean the very concept
of preferred rights to call upon government for a compelling showing of neces-
sity, or indeed for anything more than a plausible account, in cases such as
these.
L. Tribe, supra note 31, at 913.
35. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause....
U.S. Const. amend. IV.
36. 324 F.2d 450 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 939 (1964).
37. Id. at 455-56.
38. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 550 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). In his dissenting
opinion in Poe v. Ullman, which is cited with approval in Justice Goldberg's concurring
opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 495 (1965), Justice Harlan stated,
I think the sweep of the Court's decisions, under both the Fourth and Four-
teenth Amendments, amply shows that the Constitution protects the privacy of
the home against all unreasonable intrusion of whatever character. '[These]
principles... affect the very essence of constitutional liberty and security. They
reach farther than [a] concrete form of the case ... before the court, with its
adventitious circumstances; they apply to all invasions on the part of the gov-
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stitutional sources to find that a woman has a right to control her own
body.
The Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy.
In a line of decisions, however, going back perhaps as far as [1891], the
Court has recognized that a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of
certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitution....
[Tihe Court... [has] ... found at least the roots of that right in the
First Amendment, in the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, in the
penumbras of the Bill of Rights, in the Ninth Amendment, or in the
concept of liberty guaranteed by the first section of the Fourteenth
Amendment .... This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the
Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions
upon state action... or ... in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of
rights to the people, is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.40
Courts faced with the conflict between equal employment and bodily
privacy simply refer to constitutional privacy rights.41 Individuals also
have common law and statutory rights to privacy that protect them from
offensive intrusions into their physical or mental seclusion.42
Whatever the source of the right to privacy, the right is not unlimited.
Legitimate government goals can outweigh an individual's constitutional
right to privacy,43 and an otherwise tortious invasion of privacy is per-
missible if supported by an appropriate justification. 4 Thus, guards may
visually inspect prisoners' body cavities45 before and after they receive
visitors without violating the prisoners' fourth amendment right to be
free of unreasonable searches and seizures because the "significant and
legitimate security interests of the institution" outweigh the prisoners'
ernment and its employ~s of the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of
life....' 'The security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the po-
lice-which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment-is basic to a free society.'
367 U.S. at 550 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (quoting Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886) and Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949)). Justice
Harlan's remarks apply equally to the fourth amendment's protection of bodily privacy.
39. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
40. Id. at 152-53 (citations omitted). See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S.
49, 65 (1973) (right to privacy guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment protects funda-
mental personal rights, including "personal intimacies").
41. See, e.g., Hardin v. Stynchcomb, 691 F.2d 1364, 1373 (11th Cir. 1982); Backus v.
Baptist Medical Center, 510 F. Supp. 1191, 1193 (E.D. Ark. 1981), vacated as moot, 671
F.2d 1100 (8th Cir. 1982); Forts v. Ward, 471 F. Supp. 1095, 1098 (S.D.N.Y. 1978),
vacated in part on other grounds, 621 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir. 1980).
42. See infra notes 81-102 and accompanying text.
43. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973).
44. See Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Pros-
ser, 39 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 962, 1004 (1964); Nizer, The Right of Privacy, 39 Mich. L Rev.
526, 560 (1941).
45. Body cavity searches are extremely intrusive. Prisoners are required to remove all
of their clothes, bend over and spread the cheeks of their buttocks to expose their body
cavities and genitals. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 558 n.39 (1979); Security & Law
Enforcement Employers v. Carey, 737 F.2d 187, 192 n.3 (2d Cir. 1984).
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privacy interests.46 Similarly, in the third trimester of pregnancy, the
government's interest in the life and health of pregnant women and their
unborn children outweighs a woman's rights to privacy, reproductive
freedom and control over her body.47 And, although inmates of a mental
institution have a right to be free of tortious invasion of their personal
privacy, films portraying inmates partially undressed and in embarrass-
ing contortions can be shown to students and professionals interested in
rehabilitation.4" The public's interest in publicizing the inmates' plight
to individuals who might be able to improve the conditions of their con-
finement outweighs their right to privacy.49
Determining protected privacy rights requires a balancing process.
Both the alleged privacy interests and the asserted government goals
must be considered and weighed against each other." A government
goal that justifies placing guards where they can view prisoners shower-
ing may not be weighty enough to support a more intrusive policy that
permits guards to conduct random body cavity searches. Thus, whether
patients, arrestees, prisoners and customers have privacy interests enti-
tled to protection cannot be determined out of context. Their interests
must be balanced against the goals asserted to justify infringing on their
privacy. Although third party rights are implicated in a variety of con-
texts,51 this Part examines only the rights of prisoners and patients. The
analysis of prisoners' rights is equally applicable to other third parties
who are compelled to submit to touching or viewing by opposite sex em-
ployees hired by government institutions. The examination of patients'
rights in private hospitals applies equally to other third parties whose
privacy interests are infringed by opposite sex employees hired by private
employers in compliance with Title VII's equal employment mandate.
46. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 560 (1979).
47. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162-63 (1973).
48. Commonwealth v. Wiseman, 356 Mass. 251, 262, 249 N.E.2d 610, 618 (1969),
cert. denied, 398 U.S. 960 (1970). The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts sug-
gested that the film "would be instructive to legislators, judges, lawyers, sociologists, so-
cial workers, doctors, psychiatrists, students in these or related fields, and organizations
dealing with the social problems of custodial care and mental infirmity." Id., 249 N.E.2d
at 618.
49. Id., 249 N.E.2d at 618.
50. See L. Tribe, supra note 31, at 890-91. Compare Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27-30
(1968) (brief detention and frisk of outer clothing justified by officer's suspicion that crim-
inal activity is afoot and suspect is armed and dangerous) with Schmerber v. California,
384 U.S. 757, 770 (1966) (absent an emergency, probable cause and search warrant re-
quired to justify intrusions into the human body) and United States v. Mastberg, 503
F.2d 465, 470-71 (9th Cir. 1974) (in border search context, strip search is justified by
suspicion that suspect is carrying contraband; body cavity search is justified only if there
is a clear indication that suspect is carrying contraband).
51. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
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1. Constitutional Privacy Rights
a. Prisoners
The Supreme Court has held that "convicted prisoners do not forfeit
all constitutional protections by reason of their conviction and confine-
ment in prison."52 Prisons may restrict prisoners' rights, however, to the
extent necessary to maintain security and achieve the "legitimate peno-
logical objectives of the corrections system."53 Applying this test, the
Court has concluded that because strip searches and visual body cavity
searches are necessary to maintain security, they do not violate inmates'
rights to be free of unreasonable searches.' Similarly, courts have held
that because security needs outweigh prisoners' privacy interests, con-
stant surveillance of prisoners is constitutionally permissible." When
prisons introduce opposite sex guards both sides of the balance may be
affected. On the one hand, opposite sex guards may infringe inmates'
privacy interests more than same sex guards. On the other hand, oppo-
site sex guards are not necessary to maintain security. A prison's use of
opposite sex guards may, therefore, violate prisoners' constitutional
rights to privacy unless the Constitution permits the prison to justify the
added infringement with legitimate goals other than maintaining secur-
ity, goals such as promoting equal employment opportunity. 56
The majority of courts that have analyzed the privacy side of the bal-
ance have concluded that when opposite sex guards perform the touching
and viewing duties necessary to maintain security, they infringe on pris-
oners' privacy interests more than if same sex guards perform those du-
52. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545 (1979).
53. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974); see Hudson v. Palmer, 104 S. Ct.
3194, 3200-01 (1984); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 546 (1979).
54. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 560 (1979). In Hudson v. Palmer, 104 S. Ct.
3194 (1984), the Court once again dealt with the issue of prisoner privacy rights. Re-
spondent Palmer, an inmate at a Virginia correctional facility, claimed that a random
"shakedown" search of his prison locker violated his fourth amendment right to be free
of unreasonable searches and seizures. Id. at 3196-97. The Court held that "society is
not prepared to recognize as legitimate any subjective expectation of privacy that a pris-
oner might have in his prison cell and... the Fourth Amendment proscription against
unreasonable searches does not apply within the confines of the prison cell." Id. at 3200.
The holding in Hudson does not apply to bodily rights of privacy, because Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979), still governs. See Hudson v. Palmer, 104 S. Ct. 3194,
3216 n.31 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[the majority] believes that at least a prisoner's 'per-
son' is secure from unreasonable search and seizure"); cf. Grummett v. Rushen, 779 F.2d
491, 496 n.3 (9th Cir. 1985) ("Hudson involved search of prisoner's "personal efrects, not
his person").
55. See Hardin v. Stynchcomb, 30 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 564, 571 (N.D. Ga.
1980); see also Hudson v. Palmer, 104 S. Ct. 3194, 3201 (1984) (institutional security
requires a "close and continual surveillance of inmates").
56. The Supreme Court, in Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974), indicated that
prisoners retain constitutional rights that are "not inconsistent ... with the legitimate
penological objectives of the corrections system." Id. at 822. Because equal employment
is not a penological objective, it may not provide a legitimate reason for infringing prison-
ers' rights.
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ties.5 7 In reaching this conclusion, courts have relied on three factors-
history, community standards and prisoner preferences."8 Thus, in Forts
v. Ward, 9 the District Court for the Southern District of New York be-
gan its analysis by referring to the history of bodily privacy:
It is perfectly clear that men and women, from the beginning of re-
corded history, have had an innate need for privacy in certain areas of
living. Virtually all societies-even those which have little require-
ment of clothing for adults and none for children-have rules for the
concealing of female genitals. °
Turning to current community standards, the court stated that,
[T]he norm in today's western world is to have enclosed toilet facilities
in the home and segregated toilet facilities in public places which chil-
dren are early taught to use. Even small children in the western world
are expected to clothe themselves and keep their private parts covered.
These societal rules become mand tory [sic] as one approaches adult
status.61
Finally, the court relied on prisoners' preferences to support its conclu-
sion that when same sex guards perform contact duties, they invade pris-
oner privacy less than when opposite sex guards perform the same duties.
"It is appropriate to note that the women inmates have in the past ac-
cepted this inadvertent viewing [of female prisoners in the nude or on the
toilet] without complaint when done by women guards."62
On the other side of the balance, courts have concluded that the gov-
ernment interest in promoting equal employment opportunity does not
outweigh the additional privacy infringement that results when prisons
57. See, e.g., Hardin v. Stynchcomb, 691 F.2d 1364, 1373 (1 1th Cir. 1982); Bowling v.
Enomoto, 514 F. Supp. 201, 203-04 (N.D. Cal. 1981); Hudson v. Goodlander, 494 F.
Supp. 890, 893 (D. Md. 1980); Forts v. Ward, 471 F. Supp. 1095, 1099-1101 (S.D.N.Y.
1978), vacated in part on other grounds, 621 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir. 1980).
58. Many courts conclude with very little analysis that contact by opposite sex em-
ployees infringes on the constitutional right to privacy more than contact by employees of
the same sex. See York v. Story, 324 F.2d 450, 455 (1963) ("Nor can we imagine a more
arbitrary police [invasion of] ... privacy than for a male officer to unnecessarily photo-
graph the nude body of a female citizen... over her protest... at a time when a female
police officer could have been, but was not, called in for this purpose.... ."), cert. denied,
376 U.S. 939 (1964). One of the few cases to fully analyze the question is Forts v. Ward,
471 F. Supp. 1095 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), vacated in part on other grounds, 621 F.2d 1210 (2d
Cir. 1980). This opinion relies on history, community standards and prisoner preferences
to find that "it is an invasion of a female inmate's right of privacy for her to be viewed by
a male guard while she is using the toilet-even if he is acting in the normal course of his
duties." Id. at 1098. Forts is cited by many of the courts that fail to analyze the question
themselves. See, e.g., Bowling v. Enomoto, 514 F. Supp. 201, 203-04 (N.D. Cal. 1981);
Hudson v. Goodlander, 494 F. Supp. 890, 893 (D. Md. 1980).
59. 471 F. Supp. 1095 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), vacated in part on other grounds, 621 F.2d
1210 (2d Cir. 1980).
60. Id. at 1098.
61. Id.; cf. Corn Prods. Co. Int'l v. Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int'l Union, 1970
Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8432, at 4414 (1970) (Gross, Arb.) (relying on community
standards to find unspecified right of privacy).
62. Forts v. Ward, 471 F. Supp. at 1098 n.l1.
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use opposite sex guards in contact positions.63
These conclusions are not, however, unanimous. Some courts have
held that once "viewing of urinating, defecating, or showering .... is
justified by the prison's need for security, the viewing is not demonstra-
bly more significant whether by male or female. ' '64 In Griffin v. Michigan
Department of Corrections,65 the District Court for the Eastern District
of Michigan attacked the argument that women must be barred from the
housing units of a male prison. "[his argument] is based on stereotypi-
cal sexual characterization[s] that a viewing of an inmate while nude or
performing bodily functions, by a member of the opposite sex, is intrinsi-
cally more odious than the viewing by a member of one's own sex." 6'
The court found the argument unpersuasive for several reasons. The pri-
vacy rights of inmates are already seriously eroded; the guards did not
view the prisoners to embarrass the prisoners or sexually gratify them-
selves; mores against being viewed naked by the opposite sex are chang-
ing; and the argument insults the professionalism of guards.' Finally,
63. See, eg., Forts v. Ward, 621 F.2d 1210, 1217 (2d Cir. 1980); Hudson v. Good-
lander, 494 F. Supp. 890, 893 (D. Md. 1980).
64. Griffin v. Michigan Dep't of Corrections, 30 Fair Empl Prae. Cas. (BNA) 638,
647 (E.D. Mich. 1982) (quoting In re Montgomery, Nos. HC 446, HC 597, slip op. at 9
(Cal. Super. Ct. San Luis Obispo County Sept. 19, 1978) (order denying petition) (avail-
able in the files of the Fordham Law Review)).
Justice Marshall, dissenting in Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977), stated:
The appellants argue that restrictions on employment of women are also justi-
fied by consideration of inmates' privacy. It is strange indeed to hear state
officials who have for years been violating the most basic principles of human
decency in the operation of their prisons suddenly become concerned about in-
mate privacy. It is stranger still that these same officials allow women guards in
contact positions in a number of nonmaximum-security institutions, but strive
to protect inmates' privacy in the prisons where personal freedom is most se-
verely restricted. I have no doubt on this record that appellants' professed con-
cern is nothing but a feeble excuse for discrimination.
Id. at 346 n.5 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see Gunther v. Iowa State Men's Reformatory,
462 F. Supp. 952, 956 n.4 (N.D. Iowa 1979) (dictum) (whether inmates have constitu-
tional privacy rights that protect them from opposite sex viewing is open to question),
aft'd, 612 F.2d 1097 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 966 (1980).
65. 30 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 638 (E.D. Mich. 1982).
66. Id. at 647.
67. Id. Studies of prisoners' and guards' responses to integrating prison staffs provide
additional support for concluding that the privacy interests asserted by prisons on behalf
of prisoners are not legitimate or are so inconsequential that they are easily outweighed
by equal employment goals. Female prison guards report less hostility from inmates than
from male prison guards. Peterson, Doing Time with the Boyr An Analysis of Women
Correctional Officers in All-Male Facilities, in The Criminal Justice System and Women
448-53 (B. Price & N. Sokoloff eds. 1982). This study showed a moderately positive
attitude toward women correctional officers by inmates, with many neutral responses. Id.
at 448. The same researchers concluded, however, on the basis of participant observation
and interviews, that male officers respond with hostility to female officers. See id. at 448-
53. Many men's prisons that employ women as guards in contact positions report few
problems. See Woestendiek, supra note 17, at 6B, col. 3. That prisons apply their privacy
policies inconsistently further erodes the credibility of asserted privacy interests. In some
prison systems, women are barred from the residential units of male maximum security
prisons while being permitted to hold lower paying guard positions throughout minimum
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the court found the argument unacceptable because it "rests on assump-
tions and stereotypical sexual characteristics which have been expressly
prohibited by Title VII."' By concluding that prisoners have no consti-
tutional privacy interests that protect them from unwanted viewing or
touching by guards of the opposite sex, these courts eliminate the conflict
between equal employment and constitutional privacy rights.
The majority of courts have nonetheless concluded that prisoners have
constitutional privacy rights that would be infringed by unrestricted hir-
ing of opposite sex guards. This conclusion is not entirely free from
question and should be re-examined. For example, courts could hold
that employing opposite sex guards in contact positions does not violate
prisoners' rights to privacy because the government's interest in promot-
ing equal employment outweighs whatever additional privacy infringe-
ment the prison's use of opposite sex guards might entail.69 This
approach would resolve the conflict by elevating the interest in equal em-
ployment over prisoners' privacy rights. If prisoners do have protectable
constitutional privacy rights, however, the scope of those rights has been
defined by history, community standards and prisoner preferences.
b. Patients
A patient in a private hospital or nursing home has privacy interests
protecting him from unwanted touching or viewing of his naked body.
In Backus v. Baptist Medical Center,70 the District Court for the Eastern
District of Arkansas held that those interests are protected by the Consti-
tution.71 Are patients' constitutional privacy rights implicated if Title
security institutions. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 346 n.5 (1977) (Marshall,
J., dissenting).
The mixed reactions of co-workers and prisoners as well as the inconsistent protection
of asserted privacy rights may suggest either that the privacy interests prisons assert are a
pretext for discrimination or that the asserted interests are so minimal that they are out-
weighed by administrative convenience or custom. In either case, equal employment
rights take preference over such uncertain privacy interests.
68. Griffin, 30 Fair. Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 648.
69. Cf Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 104 S. Ct. 3244, 3253 (1984) (government's
interest in eradicating discrimination against females justifies infringement on male asso-
ciational freedoms); Madyun v. Franzen, 704 F.2d 954, 956, 959-60 (7th Cir.) (equal
employment opportunity for females outweighs prisoner's first amendment right not to be
touched by females because it violates his religious beliefs), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 996
(1983).
70. 510 F. Supp. 1191 (E.D. Ark. 1981), vacated as moot, 671 F.2d 1100 (8th Cir.
1982).
71. See id. at 1193. The court did not specify the basis for its opinion that patients
have constitutional privacy rights. However, patients would argue that the federal gov-
ernment, through Title VII, has infringed on their constitutional right to privacy by man-
dating employment of opposite sex health care professionals.
Hospitals in such circumstances have standing to assert the constitutional privacy
rights of patients. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 682-84 (1977)
(mail order distributor of contraceptives has standing to assert the privacy rights of its
customers because statutory sanctions are directed at distributor and because customers'
constitutional rights would be "diluted or adversely affected" if distributor's constitu-
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VII requires hospitals to employ medical personnel in positions requiring
them to touch or view patients of the opposite sex? Not unless opposite
sex nurses intrude on patient privacy more than same sex nurses. In this
respect the privacy rights of patients and prisoners depend on the answer
to the same question in different factual contexts-whether necessary
touching and viewing is more intrusive when performed by members of
the opposite sex than when performed by members of the same sex. But
the analytical similarity ends there because prisons are governmental en-
tities while most hospitals are privately owned and because prisoners are
compelled to remain in prison while patients are free to choose their
health care provider. This apparent absence of state compulsion necessi-
tates a different analysis.
The question is not only whether opposite sex nurses invade privacy
more than same sex nurses, but also whether Title VII unduly burdens
privacy rights by requiring employers to hire opposite sex nurses. The
government violates constitutionally protected privacy rights when it ex-
pressly delegates to others the authority to do what it is constitutionally
prohibited from doing itself. Thus, the government can neither prohibit
abortions7' nor delegate to others the authority to veto a woman's deci-
sion to abort.73 But the Constitution does not prohibit all government
regulations that interfere with constitutionally protected privacy rights-
only those that unduly burden those rights. 4 A state may refuse, there-
fore, to provide medical benefits for abortions" or require notice to the
tional challenge fails); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 62 (1976) (physi-
cians have standing to challenge constitutionality of abortion statute because statutory
sanctions are aimed at physicians); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 188 (1973) (same); Ei-
senstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 443-46 (1972) (unauthorized distributor of contraceptives
has standing to assert the privacy interests of unmarried persons denied access to contra-
ceptives because statutory sanctions were imposed against him, his relationship with such
persons is that of an advocate of their rights and enforcement of the challenged statute
against him will "materially impair the ability of single persons to obtain contracep-
fives"); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481 (1965) (Director of Planned
Parenthood League has standing to assert the constitutional privacy rights of married
people because statutory sanctions have been imposed against him, he has a confidential
professional relationship with the people he seeks to represent and their privacy rights are
likely to be diluted or adversely affected unless those rights are considered here). Title
VII's sanctions are directed at hospitals and hospitals have a confidential professional
relationship with their patients. Enforcement of Title VII to require equal employment
of male and female nurses could infringe patient's constitutional privacy rights. Taken
together, these facts support hospitals' standing to assert the constitutional privacy rights
of their patients.
72. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153-54 (1973). Of course, the right to abortion is not
unqualified and the state "may go so far as to proscribe abortion... except when it is
necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother" after viability. Id. at 163-64.
73. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 70 (1976) (state lacks "the consti-
tutional authority to give the spouse unilaterally the ability to prohibit the wife from
terminating her pregnancy, when the State itself lacks that right"); see City of Akron v.
Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 439-42 (1983) (state may not
require parental consent as a condition for abortion of an unmarried mature minor).
74. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 685-86 (1977).
75. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977) (a state may refuse to provide medical
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parents of a pregnant minor planning to abort.76 As the Supreme Court
has noted, "even a burdensome regulation may be validated by a suffi-
ciently compelling state interest."77
In Backus, the court found constitutional privacy rights for patients
without considering whether Title VII unduly burdens patients' privacy
rights by mandating male obstetrics nurses.78 Had it addressed the issue,
it might have changed its conclusion. A guard searching a prisoner forci-
bly intrudes on his bodily privacy rights. That intrusion must be justified
by a compelling state interest. But a male obstetrics nurse mandated by
Title VII does not forcibly intrude on a female patient's bodily privacy
rights. She can refuse to consent to this treatment and either request a
different nurse, change health care providers or go untreated. Mandating
male obstetrics nurses forces some patients to make this choice to avoid
being treated by a male nurse. But the effect on patient privacy rights is
minimal when compared with regulations condemned as unduly burden-
some in other privacy cases, regulations delegating to husbands or par-
ents an absolute veto power over a woman's decision whether to abort.79
Statutorily mandated male nurses burden patient privacy no more than
regulations that have been permitted in abortion cases, regulations deny-
ing funding or requiring parental notice. Even if mandating male obstet-
rics nurses could be characterized as unduly burdensome it could still be
justified by the government's interest in promoting equal employment.
The Backus court asserted that patients have constitutional privacy
rights that would be infringed by statutorily mandated equal employ-
ment.8 o This conclusion should be re-examined because statutorily man-
dated equal employment may not burden patient privacy enough to
establish a constitutional violation. If patients have protectable constitu-
tional privacy rights, the scope of those rights is defined by patient pref-
erences which, in turn, reflect history and community standards.
2. Common Law Privacy Rights
a. Patients
Patients have common law privacy rights that may deserve protec-
tion." "One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon
benefits for abortions because such a "regulation places no obstacles-absolute or other-
wise-in the pregnant woman's path to an abortion").
76. H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 411 (1981) (statute requiring notice to parents of
minor prior to abortion is constitutional because it "gives neither parents nor judges a
veto power over the minor's abortion decision").
77. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 686 (1977); cf. Roberts v. United
States Jaycees, 104 S. Ct. 3244, 3252-53 (1984) (compelling state interest in invalidating
sex discrimination justifies burdening individual's associational rights).
78. Backus v. Baptist Medical Center, 510 F. Supp. 1191, 1193 (E.D. Ark. 1981),
vacated as moot, 671 F.2d 1100 (8th Cir. 1982).
79. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
80. See Backus, 510 F. Supp. at 1193.
81. Tort privacy rights, unlike constitutional privacy rights, may be violated by pri-
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the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is
subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion
would be highly offensive to a reasonable person."82 Invasion of privacy
by intrusion requires an invasion of "something secret, secluded or pri-
vate pertaining to the plaintiff." 83 Patients also have a common law right
to be free from actual or threatened offensive bodily contact. The Second
Restatement of Torts provides that someone who "acts intending to
cause a[n] . ..offensive contact with [a] person . . . or an imminent
apprehension of such a contact" is liable for assault if he causes his vic-
tim to fear an offensive contact." That person is liable for battery as well
if he also causes the contact.8 5 Courts have readily found that viewing or
touching a naked person constitutes an invasion of privacy,86 an assault
vate citizens without any state action. See Felcher & Rubin, Privacy, Publicity, and the
Portrayal of Real People by the Media, 88 Yale LJ. 1577, 1584 n.42 (1979) ("A crucial
distinction between the two types of rights is that the common law right operates as a
control on private behavior, while the constitutional right operates as a control on gov-
ernment. The two rights are necessarily different because our concept of appropriate
behavior for private persons and government officials is different.").
82. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B (1977). Although intentional torts vary
from state to state, see Banks v. King Features Syndicate, 30 F. Supp. 352, 354 (S.D.N.Y.
1939), the Restatement represents the majority rule. That individuals have a right to
privacy protected by the common law was first suggested by Samuel Warren and Louis
Brandeis in The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890). Warren and Brandeis
primarily discussed unauthorized publication of private information. William L Prosser
in Privacy, 48 Calif. L. Rev. 383 (1960), reviewed the caselaw and concluded that the
rights encompassed four separate tort rights:
1. Intrusion upon the plaintiff's seclusion or solitude, or into his private
affairs.
2. Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff.
3. Publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye.
4. Appropriation, for the defendant's advantage, of the plaintiff's name or
likeness.
Id. at 389. Professor Prosser's four privacy invasions subsequently became part of the
Restatement. See Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 652B-652E (1977). Prosser identi-
fied 26 states that affirmatively recognized a right of privacy in one form or another and 2
states that were about to recognize it. In addition, 4 states protected the right by statute
and only 4 states had specifically rejected the existence of the right. Prosser, supra, at
386-88. By 1979, recognition of the right of privacy was considered virtually universal.
Felcher & Rubin, supra note 81, at 1582. Only Minnesota, Nebraska and Wisconsin had
refused to recognize the right by either common law or statute. Id. at 1582 & n.32.
83. Prosser, supra note 82, at 407.
84. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 21 (1965).
85. Id. § 18; see Bowman v. Home Life Ins. Co. of Am., 243 F.2d 331, 333 (3d Cir.
1957); Rogers v. Loews L'Enfant Plaza Hotel, 526 F. Supp. 523, 529 (D.D.C. 1981); cf.
Commonwealth v. Gregory, 132 Pa. Super. 507, 512-13, 1 A.2d 501, 503 (1938) (criminal
case).
86. See, e.g., Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891) ("No right is held
more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every
individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or
interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law."); Common-
wealth v. Wiseman, 356 Mass. 251, 258-59, 249 N.E.2d 610, 615 (1969) (injunction
granted to protect mental hospital inmates from invasion of privacy inherent in un-
restricted display of film showing inmates in degrading situations including nakedness),
cert. denied, 398 U.S. 960 (1970); De May v. Roberts, 46 Mich. 160, 165-66, 9 N.W. 146,
344 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54
or a battery. 7
Absence of consent, however, is a prerequisite to liability for any of
these torts."s Thus, although many of the procedures and treatments or-
dinarily performed and administered by nurses and doctors on patients
would be tortious acts absent consent, they are not actionable because the
patient has consented either expressly or by implication. Express consent
may be oral or written,8 9 or apparent from the patient's conduct.9" In an
emergency, medical personnel may treat a patient without any manifesta-
tion of consent because consent is presumed if the patient is unable to
give consent, no relative is available to give consent, the treatment is
clearly to the patient's advantage and there is no reason to believe that
consent would be withheld. 91
149 (1881) (presence of layman in apartment during delivery of child violates plaintiff's
right to privacy); cf. Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, 276 Ala. 380, 380-84, 162 So. 2d
474, 474-78 (1964) (publication of photograph of plaintiff with dress blown up by fan
violated plaintiff's right of privacy); Byfield v. Candler, 33 Ga. App. 275, 277, 125 S.E.
905, 906 (1924) (plaintiff's privacy violated if defendant entered her stateroom without
her consent when her door was shut, her husband was absent and she was in bed).
87. See, eg., Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 252 (1891) ("To compel any
one.., to lay bare the body, or to submit it to the touch of a stranger, without lawful
authority, is an indignity, an assault and a trespass."); Bowman v. Home Life Ins. Co. of
Am., 243 F.2d 331, 333 (3d Cir. 1957) (physical examination of mother and daughter by
insurance agent posing as doctor constitutes "an offensive bodily contact"); Inderbitzen
v. Lane Hosp., 124 Cal. App. 462, 468, 12 P.2d 744, 747 (1932) (needless and rude inti-
mate physical examinations of pregnant women by numerous medical students and doc-
tors over patient's objection "constituted an assault upon her or trespass to her person");
Estate of Berthiaume v. Pratt, 365 A.2d 792, 793-96 (Me. 1976) (raising dying man's
head to position him for pictures constitutes an assault and battery if unauthorized); cf.
Commonwealth v. Gregory, 132 Pa. Super. 507, 512-16, 1 A.2d 501, 503-05 (1938) (ex-
amination of amputee's leg with fraudulently obtained consent constitutes criminal as-
sault and battery).
88. See, e.g., Inderbitzen v. Lane Hosp., 124 Cal. App. 462, 468, 12 P.2d 744, 747
(1932); Byfield v. Candler, 33 Ga. App. 275, 277, 125 S.E. 905, 906 (1924); Estate of
Berthiaume v. Pratt, 365 A.2d 792, 796 (Me. 1976); De May v. Roberts, 46 Mich. 160,
165-66, 9 N.W. 146, 149 (1881); see also Nelson v. Patrick, 58 N.C. App. 546, 548-50,
293 S.E.2d 829, 831-32 (1982) (lack of informed consent for medical procedures can give
rise to a cause of action for negligence).
89. It has been held that surgery on a person is a technical battery or trespass unless
the patient or some authorized person consented to it, regardless of the skill and care
used. See Gray v. Grunnagle, 423 Pa. 144, 157, 223 A.2d 663, 669 (1966) (quoting Pow-
ell, Consent to Operative Procedures, 21 Md. L. Rev. 189, 191 (1961)); Physicians' &
Dentists' Business Bureau v. Dray, 8 Wash. 2d 38, 40, 111 P.2d 568, 569 (1941); Annas,
The Hospital: A Human Rights Wasteland, 1 Civ. Lib. Rev. 9, 13 (Fall 1974); cf Prosser,
supra note 84, at 420 (statutes allowing individuals to consent to what would otherwise be
privacy invasions require the consent to be given in writing).
90. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 50 & ills. (1965); Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 892 (1979). A general authorization to a physician to use his own judgment may sup-
ply a sufficient consent to procedures later employed. Where express consent cannot be
obtained, implied consent will be found and no liability for unauthorized treatment will
result where treatment is required by sound medical or surgical procedure. See Estate of
Berthiaume v. Pratt, 365 A.2d 792, 796 (Me. 1976) (consent may be inferred from the
patient's consent to enter into a physician-patient relationship when touching is reason-
ably necessary for diagnosis and treatment of the patient's ailments).
91. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 62 ills. 3 & 4 (1965); Restatement (Second) of
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To find an intrusion, assault or battery when the medical practitioner
is of a different sex than the patient, a court would need to find that the
patient did not consent to the treatment. Because patients who silently
accept treatment or who receive emergency treatment while unconscious
will be held to have consented to necessary medical treatment, the sex of
the health practitioner should be relevant only when the patient expressly
objects to treatment by an opposite sex practitioner and the practitioner
treats the patient over his or her express objection. Thus, in Fesel v. Ma-
sonic Home, Inc.,92 the District Court for the District of Delaware held
that because nearly half of the home's female patients would object to
personal care by a male nurse's aide the home could not force them to
accept that treatment without violating their common law privacy
rights.93
It could be argued that such conduct is not tortious because conflicting
social goals favoring equal employment opportunity for men outweigh
patients' common law privacy rights.94 Patients' inconsistent preferences
regarding treatment by opposite sex health professionals95 may suggest
that their concern for privacy is not very strong. Alternatively, their
preferences, although grounded in traditional role expectations, may
nonetheless be strong and entitled to protection. Case law reveals that
although hospitals assert patients' privacy rights in equal employment
Torts § 892D (1979). Emergency conditions in which immediate action is needed to pro-
tect life may justify an inference of consent to medical or surgical treatment where it is
impractical to obtain actual consent from the patient or one authorized to consent for
him. See, e.g., Danielson v. Roche, 109 Cal. App. 2d 832, 833-35, 241 P.2d 1028, 1029-
30 (1952) (no recourse against doctor who removed allegedly diseased fallopian tubes
during appendectomy where patient signed general consent and condition was discovered
during surgery).
92. 447 F. Supp. 1346 (D. Del. 1978), aff'd mem., 591 F.2d 1334 (3d Cir. 1979).
93. Id. at 1352; see Backus v. Baptist Medical Center, 510 F. Supp. 1191, 1195 (E.D.
Ark. 1981) ("The fact that the plaintiff is a health care professional does not eliminate the
fact that he is an unselected individual who is intruding on the obstetrical patient's right
to privacy. The male nurse's situation is not analogous to that of the male doctor who has
been selected by the patient.") (emphasis in original), vacated as moot, 671 F.2d 1100 (8th
Cir. 1982); Inderbitzen v. Lane Hosp., 124 Cal. App. 462, 468, 12 P.2d 744, 747 (1932)
("A physician or a medical student has no more right to needlessly and rudely lay hands
upon a patient against her will than has a layman.").
94. Even Professors Freed and Polsby, who argue for a broadened bfoq defense to
accommodate widely held social norms, see infra note 159, remark that,
[g]iven the concrete and symbolic costs it imposes, it is a fair question whether
the modesty/privacy custom has not outlived its usefulness and should now be
discarded. After all, however ingrained it may be, the custom of sex segregation
for reasons of privacy is hardly intrinsic in human nature. Not all civilized
cultures observe our modesty customs (although they all observe some customs
whose effect if not purpose it is to hold men and women apart); and in many
areas we have committed ourselves to change our customs when they prove to
be unfair.
Freed & Polsby, Privacy, Efficiency, and the Equality of Men and Women: A Revisionist
View of Sex Discrimination in Employment, 1981 Am. B. Found. Research J. 585, 597
(1981) (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
95. See infra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
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cases, patients who litigate complaints regarding intimate viewing or
touching associated with health care invariably complain about the pro-
fessional status of the actor, not the actor's sex. 96 The absence of litiga-
tion by patients regarding the sex of their health practitioner may mean
that medical personnel ordinarily respect privacy objections to treatment
or it may mean that patients are not litigious regarding their privacy
rights. 97 If so, the absence of complaints proves nothing regarding the
legitimacy of patient privacy concerns. Alternatively, it may mean that
patients do not object to treatment by medical personnel of the opposite
sex as long as they are qualified professionals.98 If so, the concern for
patient privacy is unfounded. 99
Patients have common law privacy rights protecting them against un-
wanted intimate touching or viewing. Because absence of consent is a
96. For example, in Knight v. Penobscot Bay Medical Center, 420 A.2d 915 (Mc.
1980), the plaintiff complained that her right to privacy was violated because her nurse's
husband, a layperson, watched through the delivery room window while she gave birth to
her baby. Id. at 916. Similarly, in Bowman v. Home Life Ins. Co. of Am., 243 F.2d 331
(3d Cir. 1957), a mother and daughter sought damages for assault and battery because an
insurance agent, posing as a physician, physically examined them to verify their state-
ments on an insurance application. Id. at 332-33; see, eg., Inderbitzen v. Lane Hosp.,
124 Cal. App. 462, 464, 12 P.2d 744, 745-46 (1932) (plaintiff complained that men who
treated her were medical students and not licensed physicians); De May v. Roberts, 46
Mich. 160, 161, 9 N.W. 146, 146 (1881) (plaintiff complained that presence of male
layperson in room during birth of her baby was an assault or violated her right to pri-
vacy); cf Commonwealth v. Gregory, 132 Pa. Super. 507, 509-10, 1 A.2d 501, 502-03
(1938) (plaintiff claimed assault and battery because minister posing as doctor represent-
ing artificial limb manufacturer examined her thigh and leg).
97. Ruth Gavison, in her article Privacy and the Limits of the Law, 89 Yale L.J. 421
(1980) states:
[L]egal protection of privacy has always had, and will always have, serious limi-
tations. In many cases, the law cannot compensate for losses of privacy, and it
has strong commitments to other ideals that must sometimes override the con-
cern for privacy. Consequently, one cannot assume that court decisions pro-
tecting privacy reflect fully or adequately the perceived need for privacy in our
lives.
Part of the reason for this inadequate reflection is that in many cases actions
for such invasions are not initiated. The relative rarity of legal actions might be
explained by expectations that such injuries are not covered by law, by the fact
that many invasions of privacy are not perceived by victims, and by the feeling
that legal remedies are inappropriate, in part because the initiation of legal ac-
tion itself involves the additional loss of privacy. When these factors are forgot-
ten, it is easy to conclude that privacy is not such an important value after all.
This conclusion is mistaken, however .... Understanding the difficulty of legal
protection of privacy will help us resist the tendency to fall victim to this
misperception.
Id. at 456-57.
98. One recent study regarding male patients' acceptance of intimate treatment by
female physicians concluded that "female physicians are as well accepted by male pa-
tients in the performance of vasectomy as male physicians are." Berg, Vasectomy Pa-
tients'Acceptance of Female Physicians, 9 J. Fam. Prac. 1107, 1108 (1979). In another
study, male nurses "reported acceptance by patients, with just a few rejections from older
women patients." Bush, The Male Nurse: A Challenge to Traditional Role Identities, 15
Nursing Forum 390, 400 (1976).
99. But see supra note 97.
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necessary prerequisite to a violation of these rights, their scope is defined
by patient preferences. Patients' common law privacy rights are entitled
to legal protection unless they are outweighed by conflicting social goals
favoring equal employment.
b. Prisoners
Prisoners also have common law privacy rights that could conflict
with equal employment. If a guard forcibly searches a prisoner, the
guard or the prison could be liable for an invasion of privacy, an assault
or a battery."°° Prisoners, however, must overcome a number of obsta-
cles to establish tort liability. First, they may be barred from suing for
damages because both the guard and the prison may be immune from
suit.101 Second, a guard's conduct will be justified if it is reasonably
necessary to maintain prison security." 2 Whether an otherwise reason-
able body search of a prisoner becomes actionable when conducted by an
opposite sex guard depends first on whether that search infringes on the
100. Prisoners would not normally sue for invasion of privacy under common law, due
to a number of obstacles, including the doctrine of sovereign immunity. See infra note
102. The majority of prisoner suits have been brought under 42 U.S.C § 1983. See, e.g.,
Grummett v. Rushen, 779 F.2d 491, 492 (9th Cir. 1985); Batton v. State Gov't, 501 F.
Supp. 1173, 1175-76 (E.D.N.C. 1980); Hudson v. Goodlander, 494 F. Supp. 890, 891 (D.
Md. 1980). However, there is not an absolute ban on prisoner suits against prisons or
guards for torts committed against the inmates while in prison. See, eg., Roberts v.
State, 159 Ind. App. 456, 464-65, 307 N.E.2d 501, 506 (1974); Polizzi v. Trist, 154 So. 2d
84, 85 (La. Ct. App. 1963); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 133 (1965); cf. Peters v.
White, 103 Tenn. 390, 394-95, 53 S.W. 726, 726-27 (1899) (superintendent of workhouse
liable for battery due to striking occupant).
101. Traditionally, under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, prison officials are enti-
tled to immunity from tort liability when engaging in governmental functions. Kish v.
Montana State Prison, 161 Mont. 297, 299, 505 P.2d 891, 892 (1973); see Civil Actions
Against State Government §§ 2.2, 2.29, 2.36, 2.44, 2.45 (W. Winborne ed. 1982). It has
been held, however, that intentional torts are not governmental functions for purposes of
sovereign immunity. See Shunk v. State, 97 Mich. App. 626, 628, 296 N.W.2d 129, 130
(1980). A state may waive its immunity from suit, but waiver is limited to those torts
expressly enumerated in the waiver statute. See Storch v. Board of Directors of E. Mont.
Region Five Mental Health Center, 169 Mont 176, 180, 545 P.2d 644, 647 (1976) (statu-
tory waiver of immunity limited to common law tort actions does not permit actions for
libel and invasion of privacy). A government official performing discretionary acts within
the scope of his or her official capacity also may be entitled to a qualified immunity from
liability for injurious acts. Bogard v. Cook, 586 F.2d 399, 412-13 (5th Cir. 1978), cerL
denied, 444 U.S. 883 (1979); Gray v. Linahan, 157 Ga. App. 227, 228-29, 276 S.E.2d 894,
896 (1981); see Civil Actions Against State Government, supra, § 6.11.
Courts frequently lift the bar of immunity from actions for declaratory or injunctive
relief. See Civil Actions Against State Government, supra, § 2.29, at 58-60. The federal
government has waived immunity for invasion of privacy actions, see, eg., Black v. Sher-
aton Corp. of Am., 564 F.2d 531, 539, 541 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Socialist Workers Party v.
Attorney General, 463 F. Supp. 515, 524 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), but not for assault and battery
actions, see Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1982).
102. See, e.g., Hudson v. Goodlander, 494 F. Supp. 890, 892 (D. Md. 1980); Hodges v.
Klein, 412 F. Supp. 896, 900 (D.N.J. 1976); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 134 (1965);
cf. Gettlemen v. Werner, 377 F. Supp. 445, 451-52 (W.D. Pa. 1974) (warrantless strip
search justified by state's great interest in prison security).
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privacy interests of the prisoner more than a search by a guard of the
same sex, and second on whether the additional infringement, if any, can
be justified by the government's interests in promoting equal employment
opportunity.
Thus, prisoners' common law privacy rights, like prisoners' constitu-
tional privacy rights, depend not on whether the prisoner consented, but
on whether forcible touching or viewing by a guard of the opposite sex is
justified as reasonably necessary to maintain prison security.
3. Conclusion
The majority of courts considering the issue have concluded, with little
analysis, that prisoners, patients, arrestees and other third parties have
privacy rights that are implicated when employers hire both men and
women to fill contact positions. This conclusion, however, is not entirely
free from question. Statutorily mandating opposite sex nurses in private
health care facilities may not even implicate patients' constitutional pri-
vacy rights. If such rights are involved, it is not at all certain that patient
privacy interests would be burdened enough to establish a violation. In
prisons, where prisoners are forced to submit to intimate touching and
viewing, some courts have suggested that necessary viewing and touching
by opposite sex guards does not infringe on prisoner privacy any more
than identical conduct by same sex guards.
As to common law rights, patients have the prerogative to be free from
unwanted touching and viewing, but this freedom may be outweighed by
conflicting social goals favoring equal employment opportunity. Prison-
ers also have common law privacy rights but their interests may be out-
weighed by prison security needs.
Unless equal employment infringes on protected privacy interests, no
conflict between equal employment and privacy rights arises at all.
Courts should, therefore, look more closely at the validity of asserted
privacy interests before denying equal employment opportunity. Even
after careful analysis, courts may conclude that equal employment in-
fringes on the privacy interests of third parties. Whether derived from
the Constitution or grounded in the common law, the scope of these pri-
vacy interests is defined by history, community standards and customer
preferences. The remainder of this Article proposes an approach for
resolving the conflict between these privacy interests and equal employ-
ment rights.
II. CURRENT CASE LAW: THE THEORY AND ITS FLAWS
How have the courts responded to conflicts between equal employ-
ment and privacy? Virtually every court faced with the issue has applied
the same legal analysis. After finding that the employer has intentionally
[Vol. 54
1985] EQUAL EMPLOYMENT AND PRIVACY RIGHTS 349
discriminated on the basis of sex,1"3 the courts determine whether sex is a
bfoq for the position in question. The statutory bfoq defense is the only
defense available to employers who intentionally discriminate. It permits
employers to discriminate on the basis of sex whenever sex is "a bona fide
occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation
of that particular business or enterprise." 1" The defense, which courts
have construed narrowly, is available only if "the essence of the business
operation would be undermined by not hiring members of one sex exclu-
sively" 105 and the employer can show "a factual basis for believing, that
all or substantially all [members of one sex] would be unable to perform
safely and efficiently the duties of the job."' °6 Courts faced with conflict-
ing equal employment and privacy interests have added a second prong
to the bfoq test. They have held that in some circumstances an employer
may justifiably discriminate on the basis of sex in order to protect third
party privacy interests. '07 To qualify for this version of the defense the
employer must demonstrate that the conflict between equal employment
and privacy is unavoidable. 0 '
103. See, e.g., Hardin v. Stynchcomb, 691 F.2d 1364, 1369-70 (11th Cir. 1982) (em-
ployer's policy of assigning all new deputies to work in the county jail and reserving
almost all positions in the county jail for males constituted overt discrimination against
women); Brooks v. ACF Indus., 537 F. Supp. 1122, 1123-24 (S.D. W. Va. 1982) (em-
ployer admits it transferred female out of the janitorial department because of her sex);
EEOC v. Mercy Health Center, 29 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 159, 160-61 (W.D.
Okla. 1982) (employer permitted to discriminate on the basis of sex by refusing to hire
males as staff nurses in labor and delivery); Harden v. Dayton Human Rehab. Center,
520 F. Supp. 769, 771, 776-77 (S.D. Ohio 1981) (by issuing an occupational qualification
prohibiting females from working as specialists in the male quarters of the rehabilitation
center, the employer concededly discriminated on the basis of sex); Backus v. Baptist
Medical Center, 510 F. Supp. 1191, 1192-93 (E.D. Ark. 1981) (employer acknowledges
intentionally restricting nursing positions in labor and delivery sections to females and
asserts a bfoq defense), vacated as moot, 671 F.2d 1100 (8th Cir. 1982); Saunders v. Her-
cules, Inc., 510 F. Supp. 1137, 1139 (W.D. Va. 1981) (plaintiff established a prima facie
case of discrimination because the parties stipulated that if he had been a female, he
would not have been discharged from his position as a guard at the employer's plant);
Gunther v. Iowa State Men's Reformatory, 462 F. Supp. 952, 954-55 (N.D. Iowa 1979)
(defendants admitted discriminating on the basis of sex by refusing to hire a female as a
correction officer), affid, 612 F.2d 1079 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 966 (1980); Fesel
v. Masonic Home, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 1346, 1349 (D. Del. 1978) (plaintiff established a
prima facie case of sex discrimination by demonstrating that the nursing home rejected
his application for a nurse's aide position because he was male), aff'd mem., 591 F.2d
1334 (3d Cir. 1979); Sutton v. National Distillers Prods. Co., 445 F. Supp. 1319, 1327
(S.D. Ohio 1978) (company relieved plant guard of her duty to search employees because
she was a female), af'd, 628 F.2d 936 (6th Cir. 1980); Reynolds v. Wise, 375 F. Supp.
145, 151 (N.D. Tex. 1974) (prison policy that only males shall be appointed in institu-
tions for men discriminated against women).
104. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (1982).
105. Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, 442 F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir.) (emphasis in origi-
nal), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971).
106. Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235 (5th Cir. 1969).
107. See supra note 8.
108. See, e.g., Hardin v. Stynchcomb, 691 F.2d 1364, 1370-71 (1Ith Cir. 1982); Griffin
v. Michigan Dep't of Corrections, 30 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 638, 646 (E.D. Mich.
1982); Harden v. Dayton Human Rehab. Center, 520 F. Supp. 769, 779 (S.D. Ohio 1981);
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Thus, in Harden v. Dayton Human Rehabilitation Center,109 the Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of Ohio required the prison to hire a
woman as a rehabilitation specialist in the male quarters of the center
even though the employer contended that such an assignment would vio-
late inmate privacy. The court reasoned that although sex (male) would
be a bfoq for performing strip searches or for supervising inmates show-
ering in open shower stalls, the employer could remove these duties from
the job description for female rehabilitation specialists. 110 The court
went on to suggest that the prison could install doors on the shower stalls
to permit females to supervise inmate showers.III To enhance privacy in
the dormitories, the court suggested comparable accommodations to
eliminate potential privacy infringements by either sex. 112 Other opin-
ions have reached similar results. 1 3
These apparently equitable results mask the flaws in the current major-
ity approach. First, in determining whether the employer is asserting a
valid bfoq based on privacy, the courts often fail to examine the validity
of the asserted privacy interests. Instead, they accept the employer's po-
sition without full analysis or take judicial notice that viewing or touch-
ing by the opposite sex constitutes an unacceptable privacy
infringement. 114 As already discussed in Part I, the employers' position
is open to question. Viewing or touching members of the opposite sex
may not constitute a greater privacy infringement than identical invasion
by members of the same sex115 and unless the asserted privacy interests
are entitled to legal protection, the employer has no basis for claiming
the bfoq defense even if that defense is defined to protect third party
privacy interests.
Second, by embracing third party privacy interests, the lower courts
have unduly broadened the bfoq defense, a defense that the Supreme
Backus v. Baptist Medical Center, 510 F. Supp. 1191, 1195-96 (E. D. Ark. 1981), vacated
as moot, 671 F.2d 1100 (8th Cir. 1982); Fesel v. Masonic Home, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 1346,
1351 (D. Del. 1978), affid mem., 591 F.2d 1334 (3d Cir. 1979); EEOC Dec. No. 82-4, 28
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1845, 1847 (1982).
109. 520 F. Supp. 769 (S.D. Ohio 1981).
110. See id. at 779.
111. See id. at 780.
112. See id.
113. See, eg., Hardin v. Stynchcomb, 691 F.2d 1364, 1373 (11th Cir. 1982) (modifying
system of rotating deputy sheriff assignments); Gunther v. Iowa State Men's Reforma-
tory, 612 F.2d 1079, 1086-87 (8th Cir.) (modifying job classifications), cert. denied, 446
U.S. 966 (1980); Hudson v. Goodlander, 494 F. Supp. 890, 893-94 (D. Md. 1980) (selec-
tive work assignments); Forts v. Ward, 471 F. Supp. 1095, 1100-01 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)
(structural modifications and selective work assignment), vacated in part, 621 F.2d 1210
(2d Cir. 1980).
114. See, e.g., Carey v. New York State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 61 A.D.2d 804,
805, 402 N.Y.S.2d 207, 208 (1978) ("our own judicial common sense makes it clear that
the [bona fide occupational] qualification [based on sex] is required"), affid mem., 46
N.Y.2d 1068, 390 N.E.2d 301, 416 N.Y.S.2d 794 (1979). See supra notes 58, 71 and
accompanying text.
115. See supra notes 64-69, 94-99 and accompanying text.
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Court has interpreted as "an extremely narrow exception to the general
prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sex."' 16 The lower courts
have devised a variety of tests for applying Title VII's bfoq defense.""
Every formulation other than the privacy exception requires that sex can
be a bfoq only if all or substantially all members of the excluded sex are
unable to perform essential duties "reasonably necessary to the normal
operation" of the business.118 Although duties that require an employee
to invade someone's privacy almost always are essential duties of the dis-
puted job,11 9 privacy concerns rarely render the rejected sex unable to
perform these essential duties. Male nurses are capable of examining fe-
male obstetrics patients. Female salespersons can fit male customers.
Male guards can maintain security in a female prison. To bring privacy
interests within the bfoq defense, courts have expanded the defense to
permit employers to discriminate against individuals despite their uncon-
tested ability to perform the job. By expanding the defense to encompass
privacy interests, courts permit employers to discriminate on the basis of
customer preferences and community standards regarding appropriate
male and female jobs.
This result is neither required by the statute nor necessary to protect
third party privacy interests. Both the legislative history of the de-
fense 20 and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's (EEOC)
116. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334 (1977); see Phillips v. Martin Marietta
Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 547 (1971) (Marshall, J., concurring) (Congress intended the bfoq
defense to be limited).
117. The Fifth Circuit developed an early definition of the bfoq defense in Weeks v.
Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969). The Weeks court held that
to establish a bfoq defense, the employer must show that "all or substantially all women"
cannot safely and efficiently perform the job. Id. at 235. The majority of the Supreme
Court in Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (per curiam) took a
similar approach, prohibiting application of the bfoq defense to restrict the employment
of women with children unless "conflicting family obligations... [are] demonstrably
more relevant to job performance for a woman than for a man." Id. at 544. Justice
Marshall's concurring opinion in Phillips took a narrower view of the defense, limiting it
to those instances where an employee's sexual characteristics are essential to successful
job performance. Id. at 545-47 (Marshall, J., concurring). This narrow view of the de-
fense was also articulated by the Ninth Circuit in Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., 444
F.2d 1219, 1224-25 (9th Cir. 1971), and by the Seventh Circuit in Bowe v. Colgate-
Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 717-18 (7th Cir. 1969). Under this approach, even if a
majority of the members of one sex cannot perform a job, each individual job applicant
must be allowed to demonstrate his or her ability to perform. More recently, in Dothard
v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977), the Supreme Court emphasized that the defense is
"extremely narrow" and stated that "[employers may not discriminate] on the basis of
stereotyped characterizations of the sexes." Id. at 333-34. The Court noted the various
definitions of the defense that the lower courts have adopted, see id. at 333, but neither
adopted an existing formulation nor developed a definition of its own.
118. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1982); see also Williams, Firing the Woman to Protect the
Fetus: The Reconciliation of Fetal Protection with Employment Opportunity Goals under
Title VII, 69 Geo. L. 641, 679-81 (1981) (fetal protection cannot be the basis for bfoq
defense as it is unrelated to job performance). See supra note 116.
119. See supra text accompanying notes 29-30.
120. Senators Clark and Case, floor managers of the Civil Rights Bill, submitted an
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interpretation of the defense 12 1 reinforce its narrow scope. Although the
words "reasonably necessary" could be read broadly to protect third
party privacy interests,122 and this reading finds some support in the leg-
islative history, nothing in the language or history of the statute man-
dates this interpretation.123  Nor is this interpretation necessary to
Interpretive Memorandum on Title VII that referred to the bfoq defense as a "limited
right to discriminate." 110 Cong. Rec. 7213 (1964).
121. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a) (1985) ("The commission believes that the bona fide
occupational qualification exception as to sex should be interpreted narrowly."). The
only appropriate application of the defense recognized by the regulations is "for the pur-
pose of authenticity or genuineness . . .e.g., an actor or actress." Id. § 1604.2(a)(2).
Because Congress charged the EEOC with the responsibility for enforcing Title VII and
because the agency has interpreted Title VII consistently, EEOC's construction of the
statute is entitled to great weight. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334 n.19
(1977); McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 279 (1976); Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971); cf United States v. City of Chicago, 400
U.S. 8, 10 (1970) (Court defers to definition of "train" given by the Interstate Commerce
Commission, agency in charge of the area); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965)
(when construing a statute, courts should give "great deference to the interpretation
given the statute by the officers or agency charged with its administration"); Power Reac-
tor Dev. Co. v. International Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers, 367 U.S. 396, 408
(1961) (Atomic Energy Commission's interpretation of its own regulation and governing
statute should be respected).
122. An alternative reading of "reasonably necessary" could allow employers to dis-
criminate in hiring to protect themselves from civil liability for infringing third party
privacy rights. This approach, however, conflicts with precedent establishing that mere
economic hardship to a business cannot provide a defense to discrimination. See City of
Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 716-17 (1978) (Title VII
does not contain a cost justification defense); Wilson v. Southwest Airlines, 517 F. Supp.
292, 304 (N.D. Tex. 1981) ("potential loss of profits or possible loss of competitive advan-
tage" not relevant to bfoq defense); cf. Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 799 n.8
(4th Cir.) (as court pointed out in business necessity case, "[w]hile considerations of econ-
omy and efficiency will often be relevant to determining the existence of business neces-
sity, dollar cost alone is not determinative"), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971); Bush
v. Lone Star Steel Co., 373 F. Supp. 526, 532-33 (E.D. Tex. 1974) (as court noted in
connection with racial discrimination, the "expense involved in changing from a discrimi-
natory system ... would [not] justify the continuation of ... discrimination").
123. The legislative history of the defense includes statements of individual congress-
persons that suggest a broad interpretation of the bfoq defense. See, e.g., 110 Cong. Rec.
2718 (1964) ("There are so many instances where the matter of sex is a bona fide occupa-
tional qualification.") (remarks of Rep. Goodell). Several of these remarks dealt with
applying the bfoq defense to positions in which employees, if hired on a nondiscrimina-
tory basis, would be required to have intimate contact with members of the opposite sex.
Thus, for example, Representative Goodell remarked, "I think of an elderly woman who
wants a female nurse. There are many things of this nature which are bona fide occupa-
tional qualifications, and it seems to me they would be properly considered here as an
exception." 110 Cong. Rec. 2718 (1964) (remarks of Rep. Goodell). Similarly, Repre-
sentative Multer queried, "When we come to hire a masseur in the gymnasium of the
House or the Senate, will we be justified in saying, when a woman applies for the job, that
a 'masseuse' qualifies as a 'masseur'?" 110 Cong. Rec. 2720 (1964) (remarks of Rep.
Multer).
Representative Green also spoke to the issue:
Let us taken another example: In a large hospital an elderly woman needs spe-
cial round-the-clock nursing. Her family is seeking to find a fully qualified reg-
istered nurse. It does not make any difference to this family if the nurse is a
white or a Negro or a Chinese or a Japanese if she is fully qualified. But it does
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protect third party privacy interests. Part III of this Article will show
that courts can encourage businesses to protect privacy, avoid liability
and comply with legal obligations, without expanding the bfoq defense.
Courts should abandon the expanded bfoq defense. It is not required
by the statute and it is unnecessary to protect third party privacy inter-
ests. Most importantly, this unnecessary expansion of the defense con-
fficts with the underlying principles of Title VII. When legislation
clashes with constitutional rights, courts "often strain to construe [it] so
make, a great deal of difference to this elderly woman and her family as to
whether this qualified nurse is a man or a woman. Under the terms of the
amendment adopted last Saturday the hospital could not advertise for a woman
registered nurse because under the amendment by the gentleman from Virginia
[Mr. Smith] this would be discrimination based on sex. The suggestion of the
gentleman from New York [Mr. Goodell] helped a great deal, however.
110 Cong. Rec. 2720 (1964) (remarks of Rep. Green) (brackets in original).
Even if these remarks could be read to mean that one or more of these individual
congresspersons believed that the bfoq defense was meant to protect third party privacy
interests, these individual views should not be viewed as representative of the intent of
Congress as a whole. Courts seeking to divine congressional intent ordinarily accord
little weight to the views of individual congresspersons. See, eg., City of Los Angeles
Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 714 (1978) ("We conclude that [the
senator's] isolated comment on the Senate floor cannot change the effect of the plain
language of the statute itself.").
The unusual legislative history of the sex discrimination provisions of Title VII de-
prives these statements of the little persuasive authority that they normally would have.
[Tihe legislative history of the sex discrimination and BFOQ provisions of Title
VII is sparse. Congress held no hearings on the subject, congressional rules
limited debate, and many opponents of race discrimination legislation sup-
ported the sex amendment purely for reasons of legislative strategy. On the last
day of House debate on the Civil Rights Bill, Representative Smith, a staunch
opponent of the Bill, proposed, in jest, the inclusion of "sex" as a prohibited
classification in an attempt to make the Bill unacceptable to as many legislators
as possible. This strategy resulted in support of the sex amendment by oppo-
nents of sexual equality and opposition to it by many advocates of the Bill, who
feared that Congress would not pass an overamended bill.... [T]he House...
passed the sex amendment with the support of an unintended coalition of oppo-
nents of the Bill, who voted for the amendment with hopes of defeating the
entire Bill, and many pro-Bill liberals, who favored giving women the protec-
tion of Title VII.
Sirota, Sex Discrimination: Title VII and the Bona Fide Occupational Qualification, 55
Tex. L. Rev. 1025, 1027 (1977) (footnotes omitted). Because the supporters of the sex
amendment had such conflicting motivations, it would be dangerous to assume that the
statements of any individual congressperson represent congressional intent in passing the
amendment. Mindful of this danger, courts have relied on the language of Title VII and
its broad equal employment mandate to find that sex is not a bfoq for positions requiring
heavy lifting despite statements by individual congresspersons to the contrary. Compare
Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219, 1224-25 (9th Cir. 1971) and Weeks v.
Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 234-35 (5th Cir. 1969) with 110 Cong. Rec.
7217 (statement of Sen. Clark) (prepared response leaving open the possibility that Title
VII might not require equal job opportunities in situations in which heavy lifting is re-
quired). Similarly, in resolving the conflict between equal employment and privacy, the
statements of individual congresspersons should be ignored in favor of the plain language
and underlying principles of the statute supporting a narrow interpretation of the bfoq
defense.
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as to save it against constitutional attack."' 2 4 But even when conflicting
constitutional rights are at stake courts must interpret the statute in a
manner that preserves its sense and purpose.12 The prevailing interpre-
tation of the bfoq defense accommodates constitutional and common law
privacy rights at the expense of Title VII's central purpose. Title VII
requires equal employment opportunity for similarly situated individu-
als.' 26 Title VII also requires employers to allocate employment oppor-
tunities on the basis of individual qualifications, not on the basis of
assumptions, stereotypes, community standards or customer preferences
regarding appropriate male and female jobs.' 27 These principles are so
basic to Title VII's meaning and purpose that to interpret the bfoq de-
fense to permit disparate treatment of similarly situated individuals to
accommodate privacy interests defined by community standards and cus-
tomer preferences rewrites the statute.128 The application of the bfoq/
privacy defense in Backus v. Baptist Medical Center'29 clearly illustrates
these flaws in the expanded defense.
In Backus, a male nurse applied to work in the labor and delivery
section of the hospital's obstetrics and gynecology department. The hos-
pital refused his request on the ground that "the hospital 'did not employ
male R.N.'s in the OB-GYN positions because of the concern of our fe-
male patients for privacy and personal dignity which make it impossible
for a male employee to perform the duties of this position effec-
tively.' "130 Applying the approach outlined above, the court held that
employing male nurses in the labor and delivery area would unavoidably
infringe on valid privacy interests of the hospital's female patients. Testi-
mony at the trial revealed that many of the obstetrical patients would
object to a male nurse.' 31 The court also relied on a number of other
sources including cases taking judicial notice of a right to freedom from
intimate contact by members of the opposite sex, cases recognizing a con-
124. Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 211 (1961); see St. Martin Evangelical Lu-
theran Church v. South Dakota, 451 U.S. 772, 780 (1981); United States v. Clark, 445
U.S. 23, 27 (1980); International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 749 (1961);
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932).
125. See Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 211 (1961); Cameron v. Mullen, 387
F.2d 193, 203 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
126. See infra notes 138-39 and accompanying text.
127. Although the privacy cases interpret Title VII differently, the overwhelming
weight of authority has rejected customer preference and community standards as a basis
for allocating jobs between males and females. See infra notes 150-58 and accompanying
text.
128. During floor debates Senator Case argued that the McClellan amendment, which
would have permitted discrimination to preserve good will, would nullify Title VII. See
110 Cong. Rec. 13825 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Case). Similarly, interpreting the bfoq
defense provision to permit discrimination based on customer preference would nullify
the sex discrimination provisions of Title VII.
129. 510 F. Supp. 1191 (E.D. Ark. 1981), vacated as moor, 671 F.2d 1100 (8th Cir.
1982).
130. Id. at 1192 (quotation in original).
131. Id. at 1196.
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stitutional right to privacy and a book referring to "the accepted mores
and personal sensitivities of the American people."'112 The court con-
cluded that "requiring labor and delivery nurses to be female is a bona
fide occupational qualification ... which is 'reasonably necessary to the
normal operation of [a] particular business or enterprise.' "I" Thus, the
court found that discrimination against male as compared with female
obstetric nurses was justified by the privacy interests of the female pa-
tients in obstetrics.
Between the lines of the opinion, however, lurks another form of dis-
crimination that the court neither examined nor justified--discrimination
against male obstetrics nurses as compared with female nurses providing
intimate services to male patients in other departments. The book
quoted by the court notes that, "[t]he hospital attendant not only has to
replace and remove bedpans, but, if the patient is weak enough, may also
have to bathe the genital regions." 134 Because over ninety-five percent of
all nurses in this country are female,' 35 it seems likely that somewhere at
Baptist Medical Center female nurses were providing services requiring
intimate contact with male patients. 136 In fact, although the opinion
never discusses the duties of female nurses outside the maternity ward,
female nurses at Baptist do provide intimate care to male patients. The
hospital does not bar female nurses from positions requiring that they
provide intimate care to male patients. Female nurses bathe male pa-
tients, help them use the toilet, administer shots and give them enemas.
As a matter of practice rather than policy, male orderlies and male
nurses insert catheters in male patients and shave their genital hair in
preparation for surgery. But female nurses are not prohibited altogether
from treating male patients who require intimate care. 137
Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating on the basis of pro-
tected class membership. 3  The courts universally interpret this man-
date to mean that employers must treat similarly situated individuals
equally, absent an applicable statutory or judicial exception. 39 The
Backus court, applying the standard bfoq/privacy analysis, examined
132. Id. at 1193-95 (quoting A. Larson, Employment Discrimination-Sex § 14.30, at
4-7 to -8 (3d ed. 1980) (emphasis omitted)).
133. Id. at 1195-96.
134. Id. at 1194-95 (quoting A. Larson, Employment Discrimination-Sex § 14.30, at
4-7 to -8 (3d ed. 1980)).
135. See supra note 27.
136. The court acknowledged that the obstetrics patients were treated by male doctors,
but distinguished doctors from nurses as follows: "plaintiff... is an unselected individual
who is intruding on the obstetrical patient's right to privacy. The male nurse's situation
is not analogous to that of the male doctor who has been selected by the patient." 510 F.
Supp. at 1195 (emphasis in original).
137. Telephone interview with Charlotte Mitchell, Director of Medical Nursing, Bap-
tist Medical Center (July, 1984).
138. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982).
139. See, e.g., Arizona Governing Comm. for Tax Deferred Annuity & Deferred Com-
pensation Plans v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1083-84 (1983) (per curiam); McDonnell Doug-
las Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804 (1973); McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co.,
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Baptist Medical Center's treatment of Backus in comparison with its
treatment of a similarly situated group-female nurses working in the
obstetrics department. The standard analysis, however, ignores another
relevant comparison-was the hospital unlawfully discriminating against
Backus by barring him from duties requiring intimate contact with fe-
male patients while at the same time permitting female nurses to work in
positions requiring intimate contact with male patients? Other courts
that have applied the standard bfoq analysis to resolve conflicts with
third party privacy interests have made the same mistake. 1
40
This issue, which lurks beneath the surface of Backus and other cases,
is explicitly addressed in Fesel v. Masonic Home, Inc.4 1 In Fesel, a nurs-
ing home refused to hire male nurse's aides. At the home, nurse's aides
dressed and bathed patients, changed bedpans, inserted catheters and
helped patients use toilets. 142 Twenty-two of the home's residents were
female and eight were male. 143 All of the home's nurse's aides were fe-
male.'" The home asserted that hiring male nurse's aides would violate
legitimate privacy interests of its female patients. In support of its posi-
tion, the employer presented testimony and affidavits of ten of the female
patients that they would object to personal care by a male nurse's aide
and would leave the home if forced to submit to such care. Relatives of
several female patients, the home's Director of Nursing Services and the
home's treating and substitute physicians all testified that female patients
would object to male nurse's aides attending to their personal needs. 4 s
Based on this evidence, the court found that hiring "male nurse's aides
would directly undermine the essence of its business operation."' 46 The
court reasoned that because privacy interests are protected by criminal
427 U.S. 273, 283 (1976) (quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804
(1973)).
140. Like Backus, EEOC v. Mercy Health Center, 29 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
159, 162-63 (W.D. Okla. 1982), banned males from obstetrics without discussing simi-
larly situated female nurses. In prison cases courts have held that sex can be a bfoq
defense for contact duties without comparing treatment of male guards at female correc-
tional institutions in the same jurisdiction. Thus, in Reynolds v. Wise, 375 F. Supp. 145
(N.D. Tex. 1974), the court held that "[s]elective work responsibilities among correc-
tional officers [at the Federal Correctional Institution at Seagoville, Texas] excluding
from the duties of women assignment to dormitories or shake-downs ... does not dis-
criminate against women." Id. at 151. The court failed to consider whether the Bureau
of Prisons discriminated against women by restricting their employment while permitting
male guards to work in women's prison dormitories. At the time of the lawsuit, male
guards at the Federal Correctional Institute at Fort Worth patrolled female dormitories
and performed all other correctional duties except non-emergency strip searches of fe-
male prisoners. Telephone Interview with Charlotte Barron, Executive Assistant to the
Warden, Federal Correctional Institute at Fort Worth (August 1, 1984) (policy in effect
since prison opened in 1971).
141. 447 F. Supp. 1346 (D. Del. 1978), ajf'd mem., 591 F.2d 1334 (3d Cir. 1979).
142. Id. at 1348.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1352.
146. Id. at 1354.
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and tort law, the home could not force female guests to accept intimate
care from male aides.14 7 With respect to male patients receiving intimate
personal care from female aides, the court stated: "The question of the
preferences of the male guests at the Home was not explored at trial.
However, since the male guests do presently accept care from female
nurse's aides, there does not appear to be any problem of nonconsenting
male guests."' 48
Thus, applying the standard bfoq/privacy analysis, the Fesel court's
holding permits employers to exclude males from jobs requiring intimate
contact with female patients while at the same time allowing them to hire
females for positions requiring intimate contact with male patients. The
only stated justification for permitting this discrimination is privacy as
defined by patient preference-males do not object to treatment by fe-
male nurses, but females do object to treatment by male nurses. Implicit
is the additional justification that privacy interests as defined by commu-
nity standards permit female nurses to treat male patients but not the
reverse.149 Thus, even if courts compare similarly situated individuals,
i.e., male employees treating female patients and female employees treat-
ing male patients-the bfoq/privacy analysis permits employers to distin-
guish between them because customer preference and community
standards dictate that they should.
The result reached in Fesel is inevitable if one accepts third party pri-
vacy interests as a legitimate basis for the bfoq defense. As discussed
previously, bodily privacy rights, whether constitutional or common law,
are defined by history, community standards and the preferences of the
individuals who are subjected to bodily intrusions. If the bfoq defense
encompasses third party privacy interests then it, too, will reflect history,
community standards and customer preferences and will permit inten-
tional discrimination between similarly situated individuals if history,
community standards and customer preferences dictate different
treatment.
147. Id. at 1353.
148. Id. at 1353 n.5. Although the court noted that male doctors worked at the home,
see id. at 1352, it made no effort to distinguish between intimate contact by male doctors
and male aides. Presumably, if the court had reached this issue, it would have distin-
guished between the two on the ground that the female patients consented to care by male
doctors, but not by male aides.
149. The court acknowledged that "the attitudes of the nonconsenting female guests at
the Home are undoubtedly attributable to their upbringing and to sexual stereotyping of
the past." Id. at 1352. Another possible justification that may be hiding between the lines
in these cases is the notion that males are more likely to molest females than vice versa.
Even if statistics support this notion, the Supreme Court has clearly held that group
characteristics cannot support discrimination against individual members of a protected
group. See City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 708
(1978); cf. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 453-56 (1982) (even if employer might have
reached a nondiscriminatory "bottom line," discrimination against individual members
of protected group is still a violation of Title VII). Employers must measure the qualifi-
cations of each individual.
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But Title VII, °50 EEOC Guidelines implementing Title VII 5 ' and
other decisions interpreting Title VI1 52 prohibit reliance on community
150. The only statutory defense to intentional discrimination is the bfoq defense. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1982). Congress refused to permit employers to discriminate to
improve customer relations or good will. The Senate rejected an amendment that would
have permitted employers to discriminate if discrimination would be "beneficial to the
normal operation of the particular business or enterprise involved or to the good will
thereof" or if nondiscriminatory hiring "would not be in the best interests of the particu-
lar business or enterprise involved, or for the good will thereof." See 110 Cong. Rec.
13,825 (1964) (amendment presented by Sen. McClellan). Given Title VII's legislative
history, riddled with conflicting individual motivations, we should ascribe great weight to
this indication of collective legislative intent to prohibit employers from relying on com-
pany good will or customer preferences to excuse discrimination.
151. The EEOC's Guidelines provide:
(a) The commission believes that the bona fide occupational qualification
exception as to sex should be interpreted narrowly. Label [sic]-'Men's jobs'
and 'Women's jobs'-tend to deny employment opportunities unnecessarily to
one sex or the other.
(1) The Commission will find that the following situations do not warrant
the application of the bona fide occupational qualifications exception:
(i) The refusal to hire a woman because of her sex based on assumptions of
the comparative employment characteristics of women in general. For exam-
ple, the assumption that the turnover rate among women is higher than among
men.
(ii) The refusal to hire an individual based on stereotyped characterizations
of the sexes. Such stereotypes include, for example, that men are less capable of
assembling intricate equipment: that women are less capable of aggressive sales-
manship. The principle of nondiscrimination requires that individuals be con-
sidered on the basis of individual capacities and not on the basis of any
characteristics generally attributed to the group.
(iii) The refusal to hire an individual because of the preference of cowork-
ers, the employer, clients or customers ....
29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(1) (1985). Thus, the EEOC has interpreted Title VII to forbid
discrimination based on "assumptions of the comparative employment characteristics of
women," "stereotyped characterizations of the sexes," "preference of coworkers, the em-
ployer, clients or customers" and labels designating jobs as "'Men's jobs' and 'Women's
jobs.'" EEOC has consistently maintained this interpretation which is, therefore, enti-
tled to great weight. See supra note 121.
152. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702,
707 (1978) ("It is now well recognized that employment decisions cannot be predicated
on mere 'stereotyped' . . . characteristics of males or females."); Dothard v. Rawlinson,
433 U.S. 321, 333 (1977) ("it is impermissible under Title VII to refuse to hire an individ-
ual woman or man on the basis of stereotyped characterizations of the sexes"); Phillips v.
Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 545 (1971) (per curiam) (Marshall, J., concurring)
("By adding the prohibition against job discrimination based on sex to the 1964 Civil
Rights Act Congress intended to prevent employers from refusing 'to hire an individual
based on stereotyped characterizations of the sexes.' ") (footnote omitted) (quoting
EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604. l(a)(1)(ii) (1971)
(current version at 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(1)(ii) (1985))); Gerdom v. Continental Airlines,
692 F.2d 602, 609 (9th Cir. 1982) (en banc) (consumer preference cannot justify airline's
policy of applying weight limit to females but not to males), cert. dismissed, 460 U.S. 1074
(1983); Sprogis v. United Air Lines, 444 F.2d 1194, 1199 (7th Cir.) (passenger preference
for unmarried stewardesses does not justify discrimination against married women), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971); Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, 442 F.2d 385, 389 (5th
Cir.) ("[I]t would be totally anomalous if we were to allow the preferences and prejudices
of the customers to determine whether the sex discrimination was valid. Indeed, it was,
to a large extent, these very prejudices the Act was meant to overcome."), cert. denied,
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standards and customer preferences to justify intentional discrimination
against a protected class. And they do so with good reason. By enacting
Title VII Congress intended to remove artificial barriers that "operate to
'freeze' the status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices." '53
If the bfoq defense permits employers to hire employees on the basis of
the community's assumptions, stereotypes and preferences, the exception
swallows the rule" because even widely shared social norms frequently
are motivated by discriminatory animus or are the products of past dis-
crimination. When Title VII was enacted, widely held social norms and
stereotypes prevented women from working if they had small children at
home,'11 prohibited women from lifting heavy weights or working late
hours,156 prevented women from tending bar 157 and banned pregnant
404 U.S. 950 (1971); Woody v. City of West Miami, 477 F. Supp. 1073, 1079 (S.D. Fla.
1979) (Title VII prohibits employer action based on stereotyped concepts of ability to
perform certain tasks because of sex); United States v. City of Buffalo, 457 F. Supp. 612,
629 (W.D.N.Y. 1978) (by enacting Title VII, "Congress intended to strike at the entire
spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes"),
aff'd and modified per curiam on other grounds, 633 F.2d 643 (2d Cir. 1980).
Both the EEOC and the lower courts have relied on social norms to justify some forms
of discrimination. Courts have held that employers may require their employees to con-
form to community standards of grooming even if those standards differ for males and
females. See, e.g., Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publishing Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1087, 1092
(5th Cir. 1975). Similarly, the EEOCs Sex Discrimination Guidelines permit separate
restroom facilities for male and female employees. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(b)(5) (1985).
Whether these conclusions are correct is beyond the scope of this Article. They are,
however, sufficiently distinguishable from the privacy cases that they provide little or no
support for expanding the bfoq defense to accommodate third party privacy interests.
Unlike social norms regarding third party privacy interests, neither separate grooming
standards nor separate restrooms deny employment opportunities to either sex or channel
males and females into segregated jobs.
153. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971).
154. See Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 545 (1971) (per curiam)
(Marshall, 1., concurring) (It is improper to assume "that the Act permits ancient ca-
nards about the proper role of women to be a basis for discrimination. Congress...
sought just the opposite result.... The exception for a 'bona fide occupational qualilica-
tion' was not intended to swallow the rule."); 110 Cong. Rec. 13,825 (1964) (remarks of
Sen. Case) Cin response to Sen. McClellan's proposed amendment noting that an amend-
ment permitting intentional discrimination to benefit the good will of a business "would
destroy the bill").
155. See, eg., Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 543 (1971) (per curiam)
(employer announced that it would not hire women with preschool-age children).
Although the Court declined to accept the employer's view that women with small chil-
dren should not hold jobs, Chief Justice Burger, the author of the Court's per curiarn
opinion, prior to conference in the case reputedly stated that he strongly agreed with the
employer: "'I will never hire a woman clerk,' Burger told his clerks. 'A woman would
have to leave work at 6 P.M. to go home and cook dinner for her husband.'" B. Wood-
ward & S. Armstrong, The Brethren 123 (1979).
156. See, eg., Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219, 1223 (9th Cir. 1971)
(plaintiff challenged company policy prohibiting women from holding jobs requiring
heavy lifting and long hours); Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 232-
33 (5th Cir. 1969) (company used Georgia law, prohibiting women from lifting heavy
weights, as basis for its bfoq defense). When Title VII was passed, many states had
protective statutes prohibiting or limiting female employment in positions requiring
heavy lifting or long hours. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(b) (1985).
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teachers from the classroom."' By explicitly recognizing the relevance
of social norms regarding privacy, the expanded bfoq defense invites
courts to reinstate unfounded stereotypical notions of appropriate male
and female jobs as a legitimate basis for hiring decisions. In fact, one
article has already suggested that the privacy cases provide a basis for
generally expanding the scope of the bfoq defense to accommodate
"broadly shared social norm[s]."'1 59
Privacy interests are extremely compelling. Even the most ardent
equal employment advocate is likely to be unnerved by images of male
guards conducting routine body cavity searches of female prisoners. This
deep-seated emotional response may well explain why the lower courts
are nearly unanimous in recognizing the bfoq/privacy defense. But ex-
panding the bfoq defense to accommodate social norms regarding pri-
vacy exemplifies all that is wrong with relying on social norms to justify
intentional discrimination. Even where inherent biological differences
between the sexes are at issue, the lines society draws do not necessarily
reflect those differences.1" Rather, the lines drawn by social norms take
a jagged route-sometimes forbidding intimate contact between the
sexes, sometimes not. For the past century, nurses have been predomi-
nantly female 1' and doctors predominantly male. 62 Historically, fe-
male nurses and male doctors have treated patients of both sexes.
Community standards regarding intimate viewing or touching of one sex
by the other reflect this historical fact-female nurses may treat male
patients and male doctors may treat female patients, 63 but male nurses
157. See Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 8-10, 485 P.2d 529, 533-34, 95 Cal.
Rptr. 329, 333-34 (1971) (invalidating state statutes prohibiting females from tending
bar).
158. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 634-35 (1974) (plaintiff
challenged local school board mandatory maternity leave policy compelling pregnant wo-
men to take leave without pay several months before childbirth).
159. Freed & Polsby, supra note 94, at 589. Professors Freed and Polsby propose a
formulation recognizing "that although explicit sex classifications are presumptively in-
valid, they can be justified... where there is a broadly shared social norm that requires
that men and women be treated differently." Id.
160. If they did, the legitimacy of conflicting privacy interests would be more defensi-
ble and the negative impact on equal employment would be reduced considerably.
161. Until the late nineteenth century, nursing was strictly a male occupation. It was
opened up to females "largely as a result of Florence Nightingale and her work during
the Crimean War. Men let Florence do her thing, thus turning over to women hospital
dirty work to make it women's work." Etzkowitz, The Male Sister: Sexual Separation of
Labor in Society, 33 J. Marriage & Fam. 431, 432 (1971).
162. In "1914, women constituted only 4.0% of all medical students.... In 1964-65
... women still constituted only 7.7% of medical students." Cuca, The Specialization
and Career Preferences of Women and Men Recently Graduated from U.S. Medical
Schools, 34 J. Am. Med. Women's Ass'n 425, 425 (1979) (footnote omitted).
163. [Nlursing as a feminine role has.., acquired an historical weight. The role
of nurse has been accepted as being especially congruent with the traditional
role of the female in western culture. In the United States the nurse is referred
to as 'she'; indeed in England a nurse is referred to as 'sister,' be the individual
male or female.
Etzkowitz, supra note 161, at 432.
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may not treat female patients. The preferences of individual patients re-
garding their health care providers also reflect historical fact and com-
munity standards. Male patients do not complain when they are treated
by female nurses." Female patients accept treatment by male doc-
tors165 and, when asked, even express a preference for male doctors.16s
Job stereotyping is so strong that some male patients complain about
male nurses and some female patients complain about female doctors on
the ground that they fear homosexual contact.1 67 Job stereotyped prefer-
ences are prevalent in other occupations as well. Female guards may not
view naked male prisoners, but male customers prefer masseuses to
masseurs. 
168
In short, social norms often reflect stereotyped notions of appropriate
male and female roles169 and privacy interests are asserted when women
or men try to break into occupations traditionally held by the opposite
sex. One could conclude, therefore, that the asserted privacy interests
are not legitimate; that they are a pretext for discrimination; or that they
are so inconsequential that they are outweighed by equal employment
goals. 70 But even if the asserted privacy interests are entitled to consti-
tutional or common law protection,171 they should not dictate employ-
ment practices because they are both the product and the source of
discriminatory job segregation. 172 They represent deeply held biases re-
164. See supra notes 133-41, 144-50 and accompanying text.
165. See Backus v. Baptist Medical Center, 510 F. Supp. 1191, 1195 (E.D. Ark. 1981),
vacated as moot, 671 F.2d 1100 (8th Cir. 1982).
166. See Adams, Patient Discrimination Against Women Physicians, 32 J. Am. Med.
Women's Ass'n 255, 256-57 (1977) (studies showed that patients discriminate against
female physicians); Engleman, Attitudes Toward Women Physicians, 120 W. J. Med. 95,
96 (1974) (study showed that 78% of patients of both sexes prefer a male doctor). But see
Berg, supra note 98, at 1108 (concluding that female and male doctors are equally ac-
cepted by vasectomy patients); Haar, Halitsky & Stricker, Factors Related to the Prefer-
ence for a Female Gynecologist, 13 Med. Care 782, 784 (1975) (study showed 34%
preferred female gynecologist; 19.3% did not).
167. See Brookfield, Some Thoughts on Being a Male in Nursing, in Socialization, Sex-
ism, and Stereotyping: Women's Issues in Nursing 273 (J. Muff ed. 1982) (male nurse
noting that younger adult males prefer female nurses); Mehren, Gynecology: Doctor, Too,
Is a Woman, L.A. Times, May 11, 1983, at 19, col. 2 (some women will not permit a
female doctor to examine them, perhaps because of a fear of lesbianism).
168. See Stratton v. Drumm, 445 F. Supp. 1305, 1311 (D. Conn. 1978).
169. Nursing, for example, has been one of the most stereotyped occupations "because
of its congruence with the traditional female role." Fottler, Attitudes of Female Nurses
Toward the Male Nurse" A Study of Occupational Segregation, 17 J. Health & Soc. Behav-
ior 98, 99 (1976).
170. See supra Part I. If privacy interests are a pretext for discrimination they cannot
form the basis for a bfoq defense whether or not the defense is defined to accommodate
privacy.
171. Privacy rights by definition reflect social norms that change with the times. See
supra Part I.
172. The Supreme Court has recognized that reliance on stereotypes contradicts the
basic policy of the statute because even "true" stereotypes may result from past employ-
ment discrimination rather than any innate differences between the sexes. See City of Los
Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 710 n.17 (1978).
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garding the appropriate roles of men and women. Men are doctors, su-
pervisors, managers and leaders. Women are nurses, nurturers and
assistants. By recognizing these interests as justification for intentional
discrimination, courts undermine Title VII by legitimizing sexual stereo-
types and perpetuating the status quo-segregated jobs.
In conclusion, by succumbing to the temptation to expand the bfoq
defense to protect third party privacy interests, courts have erred in two
ways. First, they have failed to examine the validity of the asserted pri-
vacy interests. Second, by permitting privacy interests to justify in-
tentional discrimination, courts have contravened the central purpose of
Title VII-guaranteeing individuals equal employment opportunity
based on their ability to perform a job rather than on assumptions, ste-
reotypes and community preferences regarding appropriate jobs for men
and women. This reading of the statute is unnecessary because neither
the statute nor its legislative history requires it. Courts can harmonize
Title VII with the right to privacy. They can preserve legitimate privacy
rights without creating potentially dangerous exceptions to the prohibi-
tion against intentional discrimination. They can accommodate legiti-
mate privacy interests and at the same time protect employees against
intentional discrimination.
III. THE SOLUTION
Courts should resolve the conflict between equal employment rights
and privacy rights by applying traditional Title VII analysis. This analy-
sis, applied without the expanded bfoq/privacy defense, enhances both
privacy and equal employment, rather than promoting one interest at the
expense of the other. Employers who segregate jobs by sex to protect
third party privacy interests are guilty of intentional sex discrimination.
The only defense to intentional discrimination is the statutory bfoq de-
fense. Unless the traditional bfoq defense is expanded to encompass pri-
vacy interests, sex is not a bfoq for these positions because both sexes are
capable of nursing, guarding, fitting clothes, searching prisoners and
cleaning bathrooms.17
Courts should rule that intentional sex discrimination cannot be justi-
fied by third party privacy interests.' 74 This ruling would require em-
ployers to treat similarly situated employees equally. Title VII does not
prohibit employment restrictions. It only prohibits those that discrimi-
nate on the basis of sex. If hospitals wish to protect the privacy interests
173. See supra notes 116-23 and accompanying text.
174. A few courts and the EEOC have already held that the traditional bfoq defense
should not encompass privacy interests. See Griffin v. Michigan Dep't of Corrections, 30
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 638, 648 (E.D. Mich. 1982); EEOC Decision No. 71-2410,
4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 17, 18 (1971); cf Forts v. Ward, 471 F. Supp. 1095, 1099
(S.D.N.Y. 1978) (while traditional bfoq defense should not encompass privacy interests,
privacy interests should be balanced against equal employment rights), vacated in part on
other grounds, 621 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir. 1980).
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of their obstetrics patients, they may do so by means of sex-neutral rules
designed to accommodate privacy interests while imposing the least pos-
sible impact on equal employment. A hospital could prohibit all nurses
from providing intimate care to patients of the opposite sex, or it could
require that all nurses providing such care be accompanied by another
health provider who is the same sex as the patient. Or it could assign
nurses to patients without any sex restriction but permit individual pa-
tients of either sex to request a provider of the same sex. In short, if the
hospital wishes to protect the privacy interests of one class of patients, it
must provide the same level of protection to all patients to ensure equal
employment opportunity.175 If the hospital wishes to restrict the em-
ployment opportunities of one sex in the interest of promoting third
party privacy interests, it must place the same restrictions on employees
of the other sex. Such employment restrictions, phrased and applied in a
neutral fashion, are feasible 76 and would comply with Title VII.
None of the rules I am proposing is purely sex-neutral. These same
rules would be characterized as impermissible facially discriminatory
rules if the classifications they drew were racial rather than sexual. With
the exception of the bfoq defense, Title VII prohibits sex and race dis-
crimination equally. Why then are they "neutral" even though they
classify employees by sex?
A prohibited sex or race biased rule is one that uses sex or race as a
proxy for something else. Thus, an employer who wants his employees
to be strong may not use "male" as a proxy for strength. He must in-
stead develop a neutral criterion such as "able to lift 35 pounds." A
neutral rule is one drafted in terms of the goal to be achieved rather than
in terms of sex or race as a proxy for the employer's goal. When the goal
is strong employees, sex need not be mentioned at all in the neutral rule.
A rule designed to promote patient privacy, however, must refer to sex
because the privacy interests it is designed to protect are themselves de-
fined in terms of the sex of the provider and of the patient. 177 The same
rule is impermissible if it draws a racial distinction because there is no
legally recognized right to be free of intimate contact by a health care
provider of another race. Absent such a right,178 employers have no
175. This approach grants protection from opposite sex contact to patients who, be-
cause they would consent, have no legal right to protection. They are protected, not
because they have a right to be protected, but because the employees have a right to equal
employment opportunities. Courts have taken the same approach when faced with con-
flicts between Title VII and state statutes granting special rights to female employees.
Thus, in Hays v. Potlatch Forests, Inc., 465 F.2d 1081 (8th Cir. 1972), the court noted
that a state statute granting overtime rights to females was not a defense to discrimination
because the employer could comply with Title VII and the protective statute by granting
the same overtime rights to men. Id. at 1082-83.
176. See infra text following note 219.
177. See supra Part I.
178. Even express racial classification can be neutral. In Kromnick v. School Dist.,
739 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 782 (1985), teachers challenged a
transfer rule designed to maintain a racially balanced teaching staff. Id. at 898-99. The
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need, in fact no right, to establish racial classifications to protect that
right, even when the restrictions apply to all races equally. 179
As a practical matter, by requiring employers to promulgate neutral
rules tailored to protect legitimate privacy interests, courts would facili-
tate the breakdown of traditionally segregated job categories. For exam-
ple, hospitals might comply by admitting males to nursing positions
without restriction, or by applying restrictions to female and male nurses
that would enhance the employment of male nurses. Similarly, police
forces could comply either by hiring female officers without restricting
their contact with male arrestees, or by restricting both male and female
contact with opposite sex arrestees, thereby enhancing the employment
prospects of female officers. In time, the presence of males and females
in nontraditional positions could alter the privacy attitudes of prisoners,
customers and patients, thus further undermining the need for restricting
or segregating jobs to protect privacy interests.
Even neutral rules, however, can contravene Title VII. A neutral em-
ployment restriction that has a negative impact on a protected class vio-
lates Title VII just as effectively as outright intentional discrimination.180
In most instances, neutral rules such as those which I have proposed
would apply equally to employees of both sexes. Both males and females
occupy hospital beds and require intimate care. A neutral rule restrict-
ing opposite sex contact or requiring a chaperone would affect the em-
ployment of nurses and doctors of both sexes.'"' But in prisons and
massage parlors and on police forces,, a rule prohibiting opposite sex con-
tact would seriously reduce the employment opportunities of female
guards, police officers and masseuses because most prisoners, 1 2 ar-
restees'8 3 and massage parlor customers' 8 4 are male. Also, in hospitals a
neutral rule permitting patients to select the sex of their health care pro-
vider could reduce the employment opportunities of male nurses and fe-
male doctors. Even a neutral hospital rule prohibiting intimate contact
with patients of the opposite sex could adversely affect female employ-
ment if the hospital implemented the policy by firing female nurses and
court referred to the rule as racially neutral because it required the transfer of both black
and white teachers. Id. at 903.
179. In addition, the impact of such a rule would be so obviously detrimental to minor-
ity racial groups that discriminatory intent could be presumed.
180. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431-32 (1971). Rules that have an
obvious and extreme disparate impact may be a pretext for intentional discrimination.
Cf Personnel Administrator v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 n.25 (1979) (case decided
under the equal protection clause noting that when "adverse consequences of a law upon
an identifiable group are... inevitable... a strong inference that the adverse effects were
desired can reasonably be drawn").
181. Male employment would be reduced somewhat more than female employment
because females use "almost all types of health-care services" more than males. Lewis &
Lewis, supra note 27, at 866.
182. See J. Minority Employment, March, 1984, at 2, col. 3 (according to Justice De-
partment, only one prisoner in 25 is a woman).
183. See supra note 24.
184. See Stratton v. Drumm, 445 F. Supp. 1305, 1311 (D. Conn. 1978).
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replacing them with less qualified male nurses. This disparate impact
violates Title VII unless the employer can establish a business necessity
for the challenged rule.
Business necessity is a judicially created defense to charges of disparate
impact discrimination. An employment restriction that is "related to job
performance" ' is a business necessity and may be applied even if it ex-
cludes protected class members in disproportionate numbers.'8 6 In this
respect, the business necessity defense resembles the statutory bfoq de-
fense to intentional discrimination-both insulate job related employ-
ment criteria from attack under Title VII. Thus, the bfoq defense
permits employers to use sex itself as an employment criterion if sex is
job related while business necessity permits employers to use other job
related criteria even though they disproportionately screen out one sex or
the other. Because third party privacy interests do not relate to job per-
formance, they cannot form the basis either for a bfoq defense or for a job
relatedness/business necessity defense.
The business necessity defense, however, is broader than the statutory
bfoq defense. Although the bfoq defense is inapplicable in race discrimi-
nation cases,'" 7 business necessity can justify neutral rules that have a
disparate impact on a protected racial group. The business necessity de-
fense also recognizes more justifications for discrimination than the bfoq
defense. But the scope of the defense is unclear. Although the Supreme
Court has implied that the defense permits some employment practices
that cannot be justified by job relatedness,' 8 the Court never has clearly
defined the limits of the defense. 8 9 Both the lower courts'90 and coam-
185. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
186. Id. at 430-31.
187. The bfoq defense is only available as a defense to religious, sexual or national
origin discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1982).
188. See Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136, 143 (1977) (dictum) (referring to
policy denying accumulated seniority to female employees returning from maternity
leave, the Court stated that "[i]f a company's business necessitates the adoption of partic-
ular... policies, Title VII does not prohibit the company from applying these policies"),
superseded on other grounds by Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982)); see also Zuniga v. Kleberg County Hosp., Kingsville, Tex.,
692 F.2d 986, 991 (5th Cir. 1982) (Court has only "implied that 'business necessity' need
not be synonymous with 'job-relatedness' "). More recently, in Guardians Ass'n v. Civil
Serv. Comim'n, 463 U.S. 582 (1983), a Title VI case challenging last-hired first-fired lay-
offs, the Court cited Griggs for the proposition that "[i]f the [employer] can bear the
burden of proving some 'business necessity' for practices that have discriminatory impact,
it has a complete affirmative defense to claims of violation." Id. at 598 (emphasis added)
(quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971)). Although the Court's
general definitions of business necessity have often mentioned a job related requirement,
see, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 331-32 (1977), the Court has never clearly
limited the defense to job relatedness.
189. See C. Sullivan, M. Zimmer & R. Richards, Federal Statutory Law of Employ-
ment Discrimination 53 (1980); Williams, supra note 118, at 689-90. The Court has de-
fined the defense in a variety of general terms. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S.
321, 332 n.14 (1977) ("a discriminatory employment practice must be shown to be neces-
sary to safe and efficient job performance to survive a Title VII challenge"); Griggs v.
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mentators' 9 ' have defined the defense in terms that encompass more than
job relatedness, but these formulations are too general to provide much
guidance for applying the defense to particular factual circumstances.
For that purpose the most useful discussions of the defense occur in the
context of challenges to employment practices that are identical or simi-
lar to the challenged practices discussed in this Article. 92
For example, neutral rules designed to protect employees' unborn off-
spring from exposure to hazardous work conditions, are a good source of
guidance for applying the business necessity analysis to employment re-
strictions designed to protect third party privacy interests.193 Fetal pro-
tection rules raise many of the same issues as rules designed to enhance
privacy. Like privacy rules, fetal protection rules are designed to protect
third party interests (unborn children) rather than improve job perform-
ance. Employers promulgate both privacy rules and fetal protection
rules for similar reasons-concern for the health or privacy rights of
third parties and fear of liability to injured third parties. In both cases,
facially neutral rules are likely to have more impact on the employment
opportunities of one sex than the other.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971) ("Congress has placed on the employer the
burden of showing that any given requirement must have a manifest relationship to the
employment in question.").
190. See, eg., Chrisner v. Complete Auto Transit, Inc., 645 F.2d 1251, 1262 (6th Cir.
1981) (A proper test looks to whether discriminatory employment practice is "necessary
to safe and efficient job performance. For a practice to be 'necessary' however, it need not
be the sine qua non of job performance; indispensability is not the touchstone. Rather,
the practice must substantially promote the proficient operation of the business.") (cita-
tion omitted) (emphasis in original); Williams v. Colorado Springs, Colo. School Dist.
No. 11, 641 F.2d 835, 842 (10th Cir. 1981) ("The practice must be essential, the purpose
compelling."); Kirby v. Colony Furniture Co., 613 F.2d 696, 705 n.6 (8th Cir. 1980)
("the proper standard... is pot whether it is justified by routine business considerations
but whether there is a compelling need for the employer to maintain that practice") (em-
phasis in original); United States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 451 F.2d 418, 451 (5th
Cir. 1971) ("Necessity connotes an irresistible demand.") (quoting United States v. Beth-
lehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652, 662 (2d Cir. 1971)), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 906 (1972);
Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir.) ("The test is whether there
exists an overriding legitimate business purpose such that the practice is necessary to the
safe and efficient operation of the business."), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971). But
see Johnson v. Pike Corp. of Am., 332 F. Supp. 490, 495 (C.D. Cal. 1971) ("The sole
permissible reason for discriminating against actual or prospective employees involves the
individual's capability to perform the job effectively. This approach leaves no room for
arguments regarding inconvenience, annoyance or even expense to the employer.").
191. See, e.g., B. Schlei & P. Grossman, Employment Discrimination Law 1329 (1983)
("In our view, 'job relatedness' is merely one means of proving 'business necessity,'
although it may in some circumstances be the only means if the purpose of the selection
device or other criterion is to predict the capacity of particular individuals to perform the
job successfully. If the purpose of the practice is not to predict successful job perform-
ance, business necessity will turn on the burden or benefit to the business.") (footnotes
omitted).
192. See B. Schlei & P. Grossman, supra note 191, at 1329-30.
193. None of the cases located by the author that have rejected the bfoq analysis have
reached the question of whether privacy concerns can form the basis of a business neces-
sity defense.
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Although the Supreme Court has not yet resolved the conflict between
the rights of women to equal employment and the rights of their off-
spring to a healthy environment, recent opinions by the Fourth, Fifth
and Eleventh Circuits have considered the application of the business
necessity defense to employment practices designed to protect fetal
health. All three circuits have concluded that, as a general matter, fetal
protection programs are necessary to the safe and efficient operation of
businesses even though they are not job related. The Fourth 4 and Elev-
enth ' Circuits reasoned that as a matter of public policy, fetal protec-
tion is a legitimate business concern. The Fifth Circuit suggested that it
would allow the defense to permit employers to protect themselves from
potential tort liability,19 6 while the other two circuits questioned the le-
194. In Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1982), the Fourth Circuit con-
cluded that "under appropriate circumstances an employer may, as a matter of business
necessity, impose otherwise impermissible restrictions on employment opportunity that
are reasonably required to protect the health of unborn children of women workers
against hazards of the workplace." Id. at 1189-90 (footnote omitted). The court reached
this conclusion by applying its own frequently cited business necessity standard from
Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006
(1971). That test asks "whether there exists an overriding legitimate business purpose
such that the practice is necessary to the safe and efficient operation of the business."
Olin, 697 F.2d at 1188 (emphasis deleted) (quoting Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d
at 798). The court also quoted the Supreme Court's language in Dothard v. Rawlinson,
433 U.S. 321 (1977), indicating that business necessity encompasses "'safe and efficient
job performance."' Olin, 697 F.2d at 1188 (emphasis deleted) (quoting Dothard, 433 U.S.
at 332 n.14). Although the court acknowledged that the safety of unborn children is not
an essential "aspect of the efficient operation of (a] business," id. at 1189, the court rea-
soned that society has a general interest in having businesses operate "in ways protective
of the health of workers and their families, consumers, and environmental neighbors," id.
at 1190 n.26. The court concluded that this interest, evidenced by the many federal
health, safety and environmental laws, supports using workplace safety as a basis for the
business necessity defense. See id.
195. In Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543 (1 1th Cir. 1984), the Eleventh
Circuit concluded that the business necessity defense should be allowed for fetal protec-
tion programs. Id. at 1552. The court "simply recognize[d] fetal protection as a legiti-
mate area of employer concern to which the business necessity defense extends" as a
matter of "public policy." Id. at 1552-53 nn.14-15. The court explicitly extended the
defense beyond job relatedness, acknowledging that "fetal protection does not in a strict
sense have anything to do with job performance." Id. at 1552.
196. In Zuniga v. Kleberg County Hosp., Kingsville, Tex., 692 F.2d 986 (5th Cir.
1982), the hospital asked the Fifth Circuit to find that business necessity permitted the
hospital to terminate a pregnant x-ray technician's employment to protect her unborn
child from exposure to radiation. The Fifth Circuit resolved the case without analyzing
the applicability of the defense to fetal protection programs. The court avoided the issue
by finding that the program was a pretext for discrimination. See id. at 992. See infra
notes 212-20 and accompanying text. Nevertheless, the court suggested in a footnote that
the defense could be available. See id. n.10. Unlike the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits,
the Fifth Circuit indicated that it might recognize potential economic liability as a legiti-
mate basis for the defense. "[T]he economic consequences of a tort suit brought against
the Hospital by a congenitally malformed child could be financially devastating, seriously
disrupting the 'safe and efficient operation of the business."' Id. (quoting Robinson v.
Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir.), cert dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971)). For
a general discussion of the issue of Title VII and the problems of fetal protection, see
Williams, supra note 118.
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
gitimacy of a defense based solely on potential litigation and economic
loss. 197
As these courts have suggested, the business necessity defense provides
the best mechanism for accommodating important public policies such as
fetal protection because it can be broadened beyond strict job relatedness
without unduly burdening equal employment rights. 198 Facially neutral
rules harm equal employment opportunity less than intentionally dis-
criminatory employment practices. A facially neutral rule, by definition,
must be directed at serving a business need rather than at explicitly limit-
ing the employment opportunities of one sex. 199 Further, a facially neu-
tral rule cannot be justified by business necessity unless it represents the
least discriminatory way an employer can accomplish a business pur-
pose.2°" By recognizing an important public policy goal as a legitimate
basis for a business necessity defense rather than a bfoq defense, these
courts ensure that the necessary goal can be met with the least adverse
effect on equal employment.
The fetal protection cases provide a framework for applying the busi-
ness necessity defense to privacy cases. First, they indicate that courts
may apply the defense to privacy cases even though protecting third
197. The Fourth Circuit suggested that the employer's interest in avoiding "potential
liability and consequent economic loss" might not in itself be a legitimate basis for the
defense. Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172, 1190 n.26 (4th Cir. 1982). The Eleventh
Circuit agreed that potential liability is too broad a factor to provide a basis for a business
necessity defense. The court pointed out:
In today's litigious society, the potential for litigation rests in almost every
human activity. For example, every employer faces the risk that a pregnant
employee will encounter a workplace activity that would not normally be haz-
ardous to a nonpregnant employee, but which could prove injurious to a devel-
oping fetus. These hazards range from slippery floors to uncontrolled cigarette
smoke, asbestos, known and unknown carcinogenic materials used in the work-
place and a plethora of other hazards of modem society.
Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543, 1553 n.15 (11th Cir. 1984).
198. The approach taken in the fetal protection cases finds further support in another
line of analogous cases. Massage parlors in a number of jurisdictions have challenged
municipal ordinances forbidding opposite sex massages on the ground that these regula-
tions are invalid under the supremacy clause because they force employers to violate Title
VII. In Wigginess Inc. v. Fruchtman, 482 F. Supp. 681 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), afJ'd mem., 628
F.2d 1346 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 842 (1980), the Southern District of New York
held that although the facially neutral regulation adversely affected female employment
"this surely does not preclude the [city from] ... prohibitfing] practices it finds harmful
to the public's health, safety, welfare or morals." Id. at 691. But see Aldred v. Duling,
538 F.2d 637, 638 (4th Cir. 1976) (per curiam) (no adverse effect on female employment
because all employees were terminated). In contrast with hospitals and prisons, the mas-
sage parlors asserted that the restriction on opposite sex massages infringed on its cus-
tomers' constitutional privacy rights to be served by opposite sex masseuses rather than
same sex masseurs.
199. See Williams, supra note 118, at 681-82 ("Traditional title VII analysis forces an
employer seeking to protect fetal health to develop a neutral policy in order to avoid title
VII liability. The employer's solution must be general rather than gender-specific. The
focus is thereby shifted to the health of offspring as affected by the exposure of both men
and women.").
200. See infra notes 208-16 and accompanying text.
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party privacy interests is unrelated to job performance. Second, they
suggest that privacy can be a legitimate basis for the defense if, as a mat-
ter of public policy, society wants businesses to respect privacy rights.
The Fourth Circuit relied on federal statutes protecting health and safety
for evidence of a general public policy favoring fetal protection pro-
grams- ' Because privacy enjoys the protection of the common law of
torts and the United States Constitution,'0 courts can recognize privacy,
like fetal protection, as a "legitimate area of employer concern to which
the business necessity defense extends."2 3 Alternatively, following the
Fifth Circuit's suggestion, privacy could support a business necessity de-
fense on the ground that employers should be permitted to take actions
necessary to comply with conflicting legal obligations and to protect
themselves from civil liability to third parties.2' Third, the rationale for
relying on the business necessity defense rather than the bfoq defense to
accommodate fetal protection is equally applicable in privacy cases. The
bfoq defense justifies intentional discrimination against one sex. The
business necessity defense justifies neutral rules directed at accomplishing
a legitimate business goal by the least discriminatory means, thus ensur-
ing that privacy interests are accommodated with the least adverse im-
pact on equal employment.
Recognizing that privacy interests can support a business necessity de-
fense is only a first step to establishing the defense in a particular privacy
case. The Fourth and Eleventh Circuits both emphasized that if an em-
ployer wishes to rely on business necessity to justify the adverse impact
of a fetal protection program on female employment, it must establish by
"independent, objective evidence" the "significance of the risk, the extent
of its confinement to the unborn children of women as opposed to men
workers, the consequent necessity of protective measures confined to wo-
men workers and the effectiveness of the actual program for the intended
purposes."2 "5 This requirement is an important safeguard to prevent the
201. See supra note 194.
202. See supra Part I.
203. Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543, 1552 n.14 ( lIth Cir. 1984).
204. See Zuniga v. Kleberg County Hosp., Kingsville, Tex., 692 F.2d 986, 992 n.10
(5th Cir. 1982). Neither Olin nor Hayes adopted this approach. See supra note 197 and
accompanying text. Other courts have also rejected cost as a basis for business necessity.
See, e.g., Johnson v. Pike Corp. of Am., 332 F. Supp. 490, 495 (CD. Cal. 1971) (business
necessity "leaves no room for arguments regarding inconvenience, annoyance or even
expense to the employer"). The Supreme Court has rejected cost as a defense to inten-
tional discrimination, see supra note 122 and accompanying text, in language broad
enough to suggest that cost is irrelevant in all discrimination cases. See C. Sullivan, M.
Zimmer & R. Richards, supra note 189, at 56. If potential liability can excuse discrimina-
tion at all, it should be applied only to excuse neutral rules that have a negative impact.
See supra notes 199-200 and accompanying text. Whether potential liability can ever
justify disparate impact discrimination is beyond the scope of this Article. But even if it
can, in order to comply with the business necessity defense employers still must seek the
least discriminatory means of complying with coafficting statutory obligations. See infra
notes 208-16 and accompanying text.
205. Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172, 1190 (4th Cir. 1982); see Hayes v. Shelby
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business necessity defense from swallowing equal employment. If courts
rely on employers' bald assertions of necessity, many discriminatory but
facially neutral programs will survive judicial scrutiny even though they
are not really necessary.2 °6
In privacy cases, the employer's proof must be legal rather than scien-
tific. Courts should decline employers' invitations to find that business
necessity justifies privacy restrictions unless the court finds that the dis-
puted policies effectively protect legitimate constitutional, statutory or
common law privacy rights that outweigh equal employment goals.
2 0 7
Concluding that third party privacy interests, if legitimate, form the
basis of a business necessity defense does not end the analysis. Even a
neutral rule that effectively promotes a compelling business interest can
violate Title VII. In Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,2" 8 the Supreme
Court created a three part test for analyzing disparate impact cases-
after the plaintiff has established a prima facie case of disparate impact
discrimination and the employer has established that this discriminatory
neutral policy is justified by business necessity, "it remains open to the
complaining party to show that other tests or selection devices, without a
similarly undesirable racial effect, would also serve the employer's legiti-
mate interest .... Such a showing would be evidence that the employer
was using its tests merely as a 'pretext' for discrimination. 21 9
Since Albemarle, the Court has mentioned the third step of the dispa-
rate impact analysis several times.210 Nonetheless, because the Court has
Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543, 1553 (1 1th Cir. 1984) (business necessity defense avail.
able because employer "already proved ... that its policy is justified on a scientific basis
and addresses a harm that does not affect men") (emphasis in original). The court in Olin
indicated that this burden of proof, imposed on the employer is a necessary prerequisite
to establishing that "a specific safety-related 'necessity' is sufficiently 'compelling' to
'override' conflicting private interests protected by Title VII." Olin, 697 F.2d at 1190
n.26 (quoting Robinson v. Lorillard, 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404
U.S. 1006 (1971)); see also Williams, supra note 118, at 695 ("The characterization of an
employer's purpose as compelling, however, does not resolve the case in its favor....
Even if the purpose is compelling, does the policy 'effectively carry out the business pur-
pose it is alleged to serve?' ") (quoting Robinson, 444 F.2d at 798). This requirement that
the employer establish that his program or rule is necessary and effective is analogous to
requirements that the Supreme Court has imposed in job related business necessity cases.
Facially neutral selection criteria that adversely affect minority employment opportuni-
ties must effectively test some ability or skill that is necessary for successful job perform-
ance. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
206. See Yuhas v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 562 F.2d 496, 499-500 (7th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 435 U.S. 934 (1978) (accepting without proof, due to supposed impossibility
of statistical demonstration, employer's assertion that rule against hiring employee
spouses is a business necessity justifying adverse impact on female employment).
207. See supra Part I.
208. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
209. Id. at 425 (quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801, 804-
05 (1973)).
210. See, eg., Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 447 (1982) (if employer establishes
job relatedness, "the plaintiff may prevail, if he shows that the employer was using the
practice as a mere pretext for discrimination"); New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer,
440 U.S. 568, 587 (1979) (rebuttal claim of pretext precluded by lower court finding that
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never applied the "pretext" or "less discriminatory alternatives" rebuttal,
its scope, application and purpose remain unclear. Some commentators
and courts have suggested evidence of less discriminatory alternatives
defeats the business necessity defense only if such evidence demonstrates
that the employer's facially neutral rule constitutes a pretext for inten-
tional discrimination.2" ' Others indicate that even if the plaintiff cannot
establish pretext, the availability of less discriminatory alternatives rebuts
the defendant's proof of "necessity."2 '2 Finally, although most courts
and commentators assume that Albemarle requires the plaintiff to bear
the burden of establishing less discriminatory alternatives or pretext,213
others, including the EEOC,21 4 "would require the defendant to shoulder
the burden as part of its showing of the necessity of the selection crite-
ria."2 '5 The fetal protection cases reflect this uncertainty in the law."1 6
challenged rule not discriminatorily motivated); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321,
329 (1977) (plaintiff bears burden of showing less discriminatory alternatives).
211. See Note, Rebutting the Prima Facie Case Under Title VII: Limiting Judicial
Review of Less Restrictive Alternatives, 1981 U. Ill. L. Rev. 181, 207-10 (1981); see also
Harless v. Duck, 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1616, 1625 (N.D. Ohio 1977) (court
willing to consider whether evidence of less discriminatory alternatives establishes a pre-
text for intentional discrimination).
212. See, e.g., Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543, 1553 (11 th Cir. 1984);
Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172, 1191 n.29 (4th Cir. 1982). One commentator has
criticized the Supreme Court's reference to pretext in disparate impact cases because
"pretext is, by definition, a demonstration of discriminatory intent.... [and] [i]ntent to
discriminate and racial (or sexual) animus are ... irrelevant" in disparate impact cases.
Williams, supra note 118, at 694.
213. See, e.g., Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172, 1191 n.29 (4th Cir. 1982); B.
Schlei & P. Grossman, supra note 191, at 1330 n.152 (cases cited in footnote).
214. See Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.3B
(1985).
215. B. Schlei & P. Grossman, supra note 191, at 1331; see id. n.154 (cases cited in
footnote); Williams, supra note 118, at 693-95.
216. All three courts in the fetal protection cases placed the burden on the plaintiff to
prove "acceptable alternatives." Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172, 1191 n.29 (4th
Cir. 1982); see Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543, 1553 (11th Cir. 1984);
Zuniga v. Kleberg County Hosp., Kingsville, Tex., 692 F.2d 986, 992 n.9 (5th Cir. 1982).
The Fourth Circuit, however, "reject[ed] the possible implication from the Supreme
Court's decisions in Albemarle Paper and Beazer that the only possible effect of such
rebutting evidence is to show discriminatory intent by proof of'pretext.'" Olin, 697 F.2d
at 1191 n.30. The court held that evidence of less discriminatory alternatives can estab-
lish pretext, or it can defeat a prima facie case of business necessity by establishing that a
program is partially or wholly unnecessary. See id. at 1191-92. The Fifth Circuit applied
a pretext analysis without discussing the relevance of less discriminatory alternatives to
necessity. See Zuniga, 692 F.2d at 992. The Eleventh Circuit applied a less discrimina-
tory alternatives rebuttal without discussing whether the evidence was relevant to pretext
or to necessity. See Hayes, 726 F.2d at 1553.
In my view, the Fourth Circuit's interpretation of the plaintiff's rebuttal case is both
logical and consistent with Supreme Court precedent. Although discriminatory intent is
irrelevant to establishing a prima facie case of impact discrimination, a facially neutral
employment policy that ostensibly serves a compelling business purpose could mask dis-
criminatory intent. If it does and if the plaintiff can show that it does by proving that it is
underinclusive or that there are less discriminatory alternatives available, he should be
permitted to do so. Because such proof establishes a new prima facie case of intentional
discrimination, rather than disparate impact discrimination, the plaintiff should bear the
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Regardless who bears the burden of proof, however, evidence of less
discriminatory alternatives, overbreadth and underinclusiveness is rele-
vant to show that a neutral rule is either unnecessary or a pretext for
discrimination. A neutral rule that has an adverse impact on the em-
ployment of one sex cannot survive if the plaintiff can present such
evidence.
How does the three part impact analysis apply in privacy cases? Ap-
plying this analysis in place of the bfoq/privacy defense will not signifi-
cantly affect the results in prison cases. Under the bfoq/privacy analysis,
rules prohibiting opposite sex guards are permissible unless the prison
can make structural or procedural changes that avoid or eliminate pri-
vacy infringements. 17 Because most privacy infringements in the prison
setting can be avoided or eliminated, exclusionary policies in prisons
have not survived attack under this bfoq analysis. If courts reject the
bfoq defense, the results will be similar. In jurisdictions where male
guards traditionally have guarded both male and female inmates, re-
jecting the bfoq defense in privacy cases will encourage prison adminis-
trators to re-examine the necessity of excluding female guards from male
inmate residential areas and to promulgate neutral rules to protect legiti-
mate inmate privacy interests.
A neutral rule prohibiting opposite sex guards in both male and female
prisons will reduce female employment opportunities because most
prison systems have predominantly male inmate populations. 1 Prisons
adopting or using such rules will be required, therefore, to establish a
business necessity for the rule. Although a business necessity defense can
be based on privacy interests, privacy concerns would not justify such a
rule because there are less discriminatory alternatives available to protect
these interests, alternatives such as installing glass doors on shower stalls,
permitting inmates to use privacy curtains or providing inmates with a
five-minute warning before morning count.
Rejecting the bfoq defense in favor of the three part impact analysis
burden of proof. The plaintiff's rebuttal evidence, however, should not be restricted to
establishing discriminatory intent because an employment policy cannot be "necessary" if
it is overbroad or if the employer's stated purpose can be accomplished equally well with
less discriminatory effects. My one point of disagreement with the Fourth Circuit ap-
proach is that the plaintiff should have an opportunity to rebut the defendant's necessity
proof, but should not be required to bear the ultimate burden on that issue.
The Supreme Court has never discussed the relevance of overbreadth or less discrimi-
natory alternatives to the employer's proof of necessity. The Court also has never de-
clared such evidence irrelevant. The Court came close, however, in New York City
Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979) (dictum), where it stated that "[t]he District
Court's express finding that the rule was not motivated by racial animus forecloses any
claim in rebuttal that it was merely a pretext for intentional discrimination." Id. at 587.
This statement should not be read to render "less restrictive alternatives" evidence irrele-
vant because it is dictum in a case that turned on the plaintiffs' failure to present an
adequate prima facie case. See id.
217. See supra notes 109-13 and accompanying text.
218. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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would, however, significantly affect the results in privacy cases involving
health care professionals. If, as in Backus, a male nurse wished to work
in the obstetrics ward of a hospital, the hospital could not respond, as it
could under the bfoq analysis, by excluding males from obstetrics ward
nursing positions.219 The hospital would be forced to reevaluate the pri-
vacy concerns of its patients and might conclude that intimate contact is
already so prevalent between health care professionals and patients of the
opposite sex that obstetrics nursing should be equally open to male and
female nurses. Such a rule fully complies with Title VII because it is
neutral and has no adverse impact on either male or female employment.
If the hospital concludes, however, that its obstetrics patients should be
protected from unrestricted intimate contact by male nurses, there are
several sex-neutral approaches it could take to provide that protection.
First, it could modify its procedures to ensure that patients are pro-
tected from any avoidable privacy infringement, such as being viewed
while using the toilet or shower. Although this approach would enhance
both privacy and equal employment, it would not eliminate the privacy
problem because in a hospital setting, many invasions of privacy are
unavoidable.
Second, the hospital could prohibit all nurses from touching or view-
ing patients of the opposite sex. Such a prohibition, although sex-
neutral, might adversely affect equal employment. If the hospital imple-
ments the rule by replacing female nurses with male nurses in order to
have enough male nurses to treat male patients, the rule adversely affects
female employment. Even if the employer establishes that protecting pa-
tient interests is a business necessity, such a rule violates Title VII if the
plaintiff can demonstrate the availability of a less discriminatory alterna-
five. One such alternative might be to require nurses treating patients of
the opposite sex to delegate intimate care duties to other health care pro-
fessionals ° who are the same sex as the patient. This approach cur-
rently is used by some hospitals and law enforcement authorities for
extremely intrusive procedures such as inserting catheters 221 or con-
ducting strip searches.' It could easily be expanded to cover other una-
voidable contacts. Although delegating intimate contact duties might
not be practical in an emergency, opposite sex contacts could be permit-
ted on an emergency basis because the patient's consent to opposite sex
emergency treatment can be presumed. Another drawback to delegating
intimate care duties is cost-the hospital might need to hire additional
male nurses or aides to handle the intimate care of male patients. As job
segregation diminishes, however, the costs of same sex treatment will di-
219. See supra notes 130-34 and accompanying text.
220. For example, another nurse, an orderly, an intern or a physician's assistant.
221. Mitchell Interview, supra note 137 (stating that this procedure is currently in use
at Baptist Medical Center).
222. See, e.g., United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 105 S. Ct. 3304, 3307 (1985)
(male customs inspector had female customs officer strip search female suspect).
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
minish because health professionals of both sexes will be readily
available.
Third, the hospital could permit nurses to treat patients of the opposite
sex, but require that whenever they touch or view such patients, they
must be accompanied by a chaperone who is the same sex as the patient.
This approach probably would not adversely affect the employment of
either sex. Again, requiring same sex chaperones may be inefficient at
first, but as segregated health care professions become integrated, same
sex chaperones will become more readily available.
Fourth, the hospital could permit nurses to treat patients of the oppo-
site sex as long as the patients do not object. Such an approach would be
permissible unless patient complaints adversely affect the employment of
one sex, in which case this facially neutral rule would violate Title VII
because patient privacy can be protected by less discriminatory rules
such as requiring chaperones or delegating contact duties.
In the short run, each of these approaches would facilitate the integra-
tion of the health professions. In the long run, the presence of male and
female health care providers filling nontraditional health care roles may
change patient privacy attitudes and eliminate or reduce the need for
privacy restrictions on opposite sex providers.
The stark contrast between the total exclusion permitted by the bfoq
analysis and the goal oriented least discriminatory alternatives required
under the business necessity defense again demonstrates the advantages
of accommodating important policy concerns that are unrelated to job
performance under the business necessity defense rather than the bfoq
defense. Rejecting the bfoq defense forces courts and employers to re-
consider the legitimacy of asserted privacy interests. Facially neutral
rules are less harmful to equal employment than intentionally discrimi-
natory employment practices because they are goal directed rather than
expressly exclusionary and because they cannot be justified by business
necessity unless they represent the least discriminatory means of accom-
plishing the employer's legitimate business purpose.
Thus, by rejecting the bfoq/privacy defense courts would compel hos-
pitals to reconsider the legitimacy of privacy concerns and to protect le-
gitimate concerns with facially neutral rules having the least
discriminatory effect possible. When applied to privacy eases in health
care, the results of such an approach differ significantly from the results
achieved undpr the bfoq defense analysis. Without sacrificing legitimate
patient privacy interests, previously sex-segregated health professions
would be opened up to both males and females. Unavoidable legitimate
privacy concerns would no longer justify policies excluding one sex but
not the other from positions requiring intimate contact with patients of
the opposite sex. In fact, privacy would not justify even neutral exclu-
sionary policies that adversely affect equal employment because hospitals
must take the less discriminatory approach of restricting specific job du-
ties rather than entire job categories.
[Vol. 54
1985] EQUAL EMPLOYMENT AND PRIVACY RIGHTS 375
CONCLUSION
How should courts resolve the conflict between privacy interests and
equal employment? Common sense dictates that we should prefer a solu-
tion that enhances both privacy and equal employment. Common sense
finds support in the law of statutory construction. When a statute and
constitutional or common law rights appear to conflict with each other,
courts seek to give effect to both legal obligations by interpreting them to
harmonize. Logically, then, the first step toward resolving the conflict
between equal employment and privacy is to interpret Title VII to re-
quire employers to eliminate all privacy invasions that are not absolutely
necessary, thereby removing the conflict, protecting third party privacy
interests and permitting equal employment. For the remaining unavoid-
able intrusions, courts should interpret Title VII to permit employers to
protect privacy interests, but require that they devise ways of protecting
those interests that minimize any negative impact on equal employment.
Does Title VII permit such a solution? Yes! Under traditional Title
VII analysis, the privacy interests of third parties cannot be a basis for a
bfoq defense because males and females are equally capable of caring for
patients, searching and supervising prisoners, fitting clothes and cleaning
bathrooms and locker rooms. Courts faced with conflicting privacy in-
terests have succumbed to the temptation to broaden the bfoq defense to
accommodate privacy interests. This approach creates inequities and
maintains the status quo. Privacy interests can be accommodated with-
out expanding the bfoq defense. Courts should apply a narrow bfoq de-
fense and prohibit employers from intentionally discriminating against
one sex to protect third party privacy interests. Title VII permits em-
ployers to impose legitimate nondiscriminatory policies that are not a
pretext for discrimination, policies such as those I have suggested. Strict
application of the bfoq defense would encourage employers to adopt neu-
tral policies to protect patient, customer or prisoner privacy interests. Of
course, some facially neutral policies will reduce the employment oppor-
tunities of one sex or the other. That adverse impact can be justified by
business necessity. The business necessity defense is the best place to
accommodate important policy concerns such as privacy. The defense is
only available to justify neutral rules that are necessary and effective to
protect legitimate privacy interests and that are the least discriminatory
means of protecting those interests. Thus, Title VII leaves room for care-
fully crafted neutral employment policies designed to protect legitimate
privacy interests while restricting equal employment to the least extent
possible.

